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A Model of Household Online Buying 
 
The Internet has made profound changes in how people conduct their daily lives as well 
as how they buy goods and services. This study’s objective is to shed light on the use and 
diffusion of online or electronic buying (e-buying). Canadian households have not 
adopted e-buying equally, as revealed by Statistics Canada’s Household Internet Use 
Survey (HIUS) data of 1997 – 2003. We explore how e-buying varies across age groups, 
genders, education levels, income levels, and the nature of goods. We first develop a 
simple model for e-buying demand in the context of a utility-maximizing individual 
choosing between e-buying and conventional buying. We employ a parameter reflecting 
individual taste, so we can study the influence of individual-specific factors in e-buying 
adoption decisions. The taste parameter is distributed in a population in some unknown 
way, and we try different distributions in empirical tests. We use the literature in 
conjunction with the model to derive the model’s implications in terms of variables 
available in the HIUS datasets. We employ Tobit and Poisson regression models for the 
empirical tests. The tests suggest that household e-buying is more when household 
income is more, when heads of households are more educated, and for homogeneous 
goods; but that household e-buying is less when heads of households are female. This 
understanding may help policy makers, businesses, and other interested parties find ways 
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 Introduction  
 
1.1 Background to the Research 
 
The Internet has enabled profound changes in how people conduct their daily lives as 
well as how they buy goods and services. The Internet brings a world of information to 
homes, with a few clicks. The main characteristic of the Internet is the almost 
instantaneous communication of information that fundamentally has changed how our 
socio-economic world operates. The Internet’s main uses have been interpersonal 
communication through electronic mail (e-mail), online chatting, entertainment, world-
wide access to information, online banking, online learning, working from home, 
electronic commerce (e-commerce, e-com), and electronic governance (e-governance). 
The Internet’s diffusion has been rapid in the last ten years, especially in the developed 
world. For instance, in Canada the percentage of households with a computer at home 
increased from 45% in 1999 to 65% in 2003, and the percentage of households with any 
kind of connection increased from 29% to 54%. The percentage of households using e-
mail increased from 26% to 52% and households with a high-speed connection increased 
from 3% to 34% over the same period. 
  
The growth in online buying or electronic buying (e-buying) and online payment or 
electronic payment (e-paying) has also been noteworthy. The percentage of Canadian 
households with connections that e-buy (at least once in the past year) increased from 8% 
in 1999 to 29% in 2003 and those who e-buy and e-pay increased from 5% to 22%. E-
commerce as a whole is growing rapidly all over the world, and retail e-commerce 
(household e-buying) in the U.S. was expected to grow from $45 billion in 2000, or 1.5% 
of total retail sales, to $269 billion in 2005, or 7.8% of total retail sales. With “click and 
mortar” sales1 included, total retail sales affected by e-com in 2005 are expected to be 
$647 billion or 18.5% of total retail sales (Bakos, 2001). The Canadian e-commerce 
                                                 
1 A ”click and mortar” sale refers to a sale in which the household collects information about goods online 
and then buys the goods in a traditional retail outlet, also known as a ”brick and mortar” store.  
 2 
market was estimated to have increased from C$ 5.3 billion in 1998 to C$ 80 billion in 
2003 (Michalak and Jones, 2003). 
 
This study’s objective is to shed light on the use and diffusion of e-buying. Statistics 
Canada collected data on household Internet behaviour from 1997 – 2003 with the 
Household Internet Use Survey (HIUS). These data enable the study of determinants of 
use and diffusion of e-buying in Canadian households.   
 
1.2 Research Questions and Research Objective 
 
Canadian consumers have not adopted e-buying equally when presented with the 
technological opportunity of e-buying. Individual-specific factors may explain why some 
consumers e-buy while others do not. To explore issues concerning factors that influence 
e-buying adoption by the public, we choose as our question for this research, “how does 
e-buying intensity vary across age groups, gender, education levels, income levels, and 
the nature of goods?” 
 
1.3 Justification for the Research 
 
The HIUS data, which we use for empirical hypotheses tests, include data pertaining to 
variables such as the categories of goods ordered by the sample households; individual-
specific (or household-specific) details such as age group, gender, and education level of 
the heads of the sample households; the income levels of the sample households; the 
types of  connections; whether the sample households ordered any goods online in the 
past twelve months, and if so, the number of orders placed and their dollar value. These 
data enable research into the determinants and the diffusion and use and e-buying by 
Canadian households.  
 
New technologies often bring benefits in the form of incremental and transformational 
improvements. Hence, it is often desirable that new technologies and innovations diffuse 
quickly in economies. Though new technologies may be beneficial, some technologies 
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may not be accepted at all by users, and many take more time to diffuse than desired. 
Some diffuse fast. The technological diffusion rate and the determinants of adoption may 
vary from country to country. In view of these complexities, it is of interest to study 
various aspects of diffusion of technologies in economies; knowledge from such studies 
may help with diffusion of similar technologies in the future.  
 
The research question that we have adopted will help us understand what individual-
specific factors drive households to adopt Internet use and e-buying. Such understanding 
will help policy makers and administrators, businesses, and other interested parties find 
ways to promote Internet use and e-buying across all segments of society. For example, if 
it is found that households with an older person as the head of household e-buy less, then 
businesses may target such households with appropriate strategies to increase e-buying, 




We first develop a simple theoretical model for e-buying demand in the context of a 
utility-maximizing individual faced with the choice of e-buying or conventional buying. 
In developing the model, we employ a parameter that reflects individual taste so we can 
study the influence of individual-specific factors in the adoption decisions of e-buying. 
The taste parameter is distributed in a population in some way, which we need to 
identify. Since the parameter’s distribution is modeled in general form, we can try 
different distributions in empirical tests.   
 
We then use the literature in conjunction with the model to derive the model’s 
implications in terms of variables available in the HIUS 1999 -  2003 datasets. We then 
empirically test the hypotheses developed, using regression methods. We use e-buying 
activity measures as dependent variables. Since these are limited dependent variables, we 




1.5 Outline of the Thesis 
 
Chapter 2 reviews literature pertaining to the Internet’s impacts on trade (economic and 
social), diffusion of technologies, determinants of Internet use (socio-economic and 
behavioural), and e-commerce and tax. Chapter 3 deals with the theoretical and empirical 
models. We note the assumptions of the theoretical model and then develop it; we then 
derive its implications, compare them to the literature, and develop hypotheses for 
empirical tests. We then present the empirical model equation and briefly mention the 
regression methods, Tobit and Poisson. Chapter 4 describes the HIUS data and the 
methods for empirical tests that we use. We note some details of the SHAZAM 
procedures of Tobit and Poisson regressions. Chapter 5 presents the empirical results and 
analysis, and notes issues associated with the theoretical model and empirical tests. 
Chapter 6 concludes by revisiting the research objective, summarizing our approach, 
revisiting the results, recording the limitations of the research, and identifying some 























A thorough review of the literature on the diffusion of the Internet and its applications 
follows. This section of the literature review opens with a review of models of diffusion 
of technologies, chiefly the S-curve model, followed by a review of the literature on 
alternative models of diffusion. At a more basic level, we review the literature on 
determinants of Internet use, especially socio-economic and behavioural. A review of the 
considerable volume of literature on determinants of applications use in organizations 
will help us in studying determinants of the application adoption by individuals.  
Taxation has been a relevant concern of researchers and policy makers in studies of 
adoption of the Internet and electronic commerce.  Hence, we close the literature review 
with a discussion of research on the importance of taxation on the Internet and e-
commerce adoption decisions by individuals.  
 
2.2 Impacts of the Internet  
 
2.2.1 Economic Impacts of the Internet on Trade 
 
2.2.1.1 Cost Reduction 
 
Bakos (1997) investigates how the Internet impacts the marketplace through reduced 
buyer search costs. The paper develops theoretical models of search costs in 
differentiated markets and also theoretical models of incentives for buyers, sellers, and 
intermediaries to invest in electronic marketplaces. The paper shows that, if search costs 
are low enough in electronic markets, buyers will buy products that best serve their 
needs, resulting in a socially optimal allocation. The paper argues further that buyers gain 
from rent redistribution through lower prices, in addition to the social benefits of lower 
search costs and better matching of buyers and sellers.  
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2.2.1.2 Creation of Value 
 
Borenstein and Saloner (2001) give an elaborate account of how value is created and 
distributed in e-commerce, from the viewpoint of standard microeconomics. The earliest 
effect of the Internet on markets is incremental and rests on cost reduction. In due course, 
drastic shifts arise, i.e. through e-commerce new opportunities are possible, resulting in 
business restructuring.  
 
The Internet creates value by drastically reducing the cost of transferring information. If 
the product itself is information, the possibilities for value creation are significant. When 
the transaction involves a tangible good with information and the cost of moving the 
good is low in comparison to the value of the good, the reach of the Internet is much 
greater than traditional alternatives. An example is a unique item that a buyer may value 
highly. The main effect of increased geographical market reach is the improvement in the 
matching of the buyer and the good, especially in inefficient markets. An example is the 
used consumer durable market.  
 
Even when the cost of transportation is high, the Internet causes an increasing separation 
of movement of goods and information. Information from the Internet has many valuable 
characteristics: first, it is inexpensive; second, communication can be asynchronous—an 
especially valuable characteristic in the face of a globalizing economy; third, greater 
interactivity and search capability drastically reduce the costs of customization of service.  
 
Value is created either on the cost side or on the demand side. On the cost side, the cost 
reduction in distribution can be very large. In business to consumer (B2C) commerce, in-
store operations costs may be reduced, by reducing shoplifting2, rent, selling costs, etc. In 
addition, online buyers enjoy effectively lower taxes. The Internet is also causing changes 
in the production process. In the service sector, some functions can be out-sourced to 
regions with a cost or time-difference advantage.  
                                                 
2 The authors state that this is as high as 3 per cent of the retailer’s sales. 
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On the demand side, improved matching of supplier and buyer occurs through improved 
information, better access to goods, and ease of customization. Still, issues of fit, feel, 
quality, real appearance of goods, etc. remain. A solution may be the hybrid store that can 
serve as a showroom and handle online delivery. However, the showroom concept suffers 
from the “free-rider” problem: the situation of customers checking goods in the 
showroom and then buying the goods online from another seller who sells only online. 
Such a seller is likely to have low overhead. 
 
2.2.1.3 Distribution of Value 
 
As per Borenstein and Saloner (2001), online markets seem to be marked by price 
dispersion and increasing market concentration. Sustainable price dispersion depends on 
“stickiness.” Since most customers value non-financial aspects such as trustworthiness 
and after-sales support, they may “stick” with certain sellers. Economies of scale in 
shipping and handling may force them to stick to a few sellers. Finally, retailers create 
stickiness through website customization, design, etc.  
 
It is not clear how much price dispersion will survive in equilibrium. By tracking online 
consumers’ behaviour, sellers engage in price discrimination. This is actually a kind of 
price dispersion, but for the same product among different customers. On the other hand, 
technology provides applications that enable buyers to compare online prices. This ability 
can counter price dispersion. However, the balance of the two in equilibrium is difficult 
to predict. The equilibrium market structure, which is still not clear, will decide how the 
value created by e-commerce is distributed among competing firms, customers, and 
intermediaries.  
   
Vulkan (2003) provides another detailed treatment of the creation and distribution of 
value in e-commerce. In “automated e-commerce,” automated software known as “agent 
technologies” conducts product searches, price negotiations, intermediation services, etc. 
on behalf of buyers, sellers, and intermediaries. These programs can result in improved 
transaction times, a higher quality of search, a better match of buyer and good, etc. 
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Moreover, business can be carried out in ways previously impractical, including auctions 
in which people from all over the world participate. The extensive use of economic tools 
such as game theoretic models is possible in e-commerce, especially in auctions, because 
of the automation of commerce. These tools not only reduce cost but also improve the 
match of buyer and good. E-commerce can also seamlessly integrate various functions of 
a firm, such as buying, operations, support functions, and sales. As regards distribution of 
value, automated e-commerce also incorporates personalization technologies that track an 
online buyer, identify her preferences, recommend products, and permit customization.  
This ability can blunt the buyer’s price comparison ability, thereby enabling the seller to 
engage in “dynamic pricing” and charge a different and usually higher price. However, 
the buyer also has software to help him or her. In effect, the individual consumer 
becomes a separate market of his or her own that many firms compete to capture. The 
resulting dynamics are complex, so how value is distributed is difficult to predict.  
 
2.2.1.4 Internet Pricing 
 
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) analyze the pricing behaviour in Internet trade to verify 
the claim that e-commerce is frictionless. Despite such a claim, research has shown that 
price sensitivity can be lower in Internet trade, that trust can cause decreased price 
sensitivity in Internet trade, that the provision of better information to customers can 
increase loyalty, that Internet prices for used cars are greater than their physical auction 
price, and so on.  
 
To further explore the issue, these researchers studied the pricing behaviour of online 
retail outlets engaged in the trade of two homogenous goods–books and CDs, and 
compared their pricing behaviour to that of conventional retailers. They used data of 8500 
pricing observations spread over 15 months in 1998-99 pertaining to 41 online and 
conventional retail outlets. In their analysis, they considered 4 Internet outlets, 8 hybrid 
outlets, and 4 conventional outlets each for books and CDs. Some of the retailers were 
replaced with others in the course of the study. The price data are for 20 book titles and 
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20 CD titles. The Internet and hybrid retailers sampled covered more than 96% of the 
web-page hits for both goods.  
 
The above researchers conducted statistical and econometric tests on the data. The 
important results are as follows: Internet retailers have a much larger selection of goods; 
the mean price of Internet stores was significantly lower than that of conventional stores, 
15.5% for books and 16.1% for CDs (p < 0.001); the lowest Internet price was less than 
the lowest conventional store price 92% of the time for books and 84.6% of the times for 
CDs (p < 0.05); the mean Internet price (including shipping, handling, and taxes) was 
lower than the mean conventional price by 9% for books and by 13% for CDs (p < 
0.001); the lowest Internet price (including shipping, handling, and taxes) was lower than 
the lowest conventional price (including shipping, handling, and taxes) around 83% of 
the times for both books and CDs (p < 0.05 or better); the price adjustments were as low 
as $ 0.05 for books and $ 0.01 for CDs in Internet trade whereas they were $ 0.35 for 
books and $1.00 for CDs in conventional trade; the standard deviation of price 
adjustments on the Internet was lower than that in conventional trade for both books and 
CDs; and there is less dispersion in weighted3 prices on the Internet than in conventional 
outlets for both books and CDs, though the unweighted price dispersion on the Internet 
was as high as 47%, with the average being 33% for books and 25% for CDs. 
 
The above findings suggest that Internet trade is more efficient than conventional trade, 
but not completely efficient. It is not friction-less, but it has less friction. Friction comes 
from factors such as the importance of location of a retailer in the physical world or in 
virtual space, lack of information, retailers making positive economic profit, lack of price 
competition due to retailer heterogeneity, price dispersion, level of prices, inability to 
adjust price in accordance with supply and demand, etc. Internet trade has less friction 
mainly because (1) it is easier to access a particular online retailer than a particular 
physical store, (2) it is easier to get information about retailers and goods in online trade 
than in physical trade, (3) online prices4 and price dispersions are generally lower than in 
                                                 
3 Weighting is as per market share of the retailers. 
4 If price is more than what it would be under perfect competition, it contributes to friction.  
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physical stores, and (3) it is possible to adjust prices more often and minutely in online 
trade than in physical stores.  Internet trade has some friction mainly because (1) not all 
online sellers are equally accessible to buyers (since not all can afford high advertising 
costs), (2) there is information asymmetry between sellers and buyers, (3) retailers can 
charge excess prices through price discrimination, and (4) there is heterogeneity among 
online retailers. The evidence for less friction in online trade are as follows: (1) the study 
finds that Internet price adjustments are much smaller, suggesting lower menu costs and 
frequent adjustments; frequent adjustments help to keep prices in line with structural 
adjustments in supply and demand, (2) the price dispersion weighted by market share was 
actually lower in Internet trade, implying market concentration in Internet trade and 
dominance by some heavily branded retailers; in fact, the study found that the market 
shares of the dominant firms were much higher in Internet trade than in conventional 
trade, and (3) price is generally lower in Internet trade, suggesting that the Internet lowers 
costs.  The evidence for presence of some friction in online trade is from the authors’ 
finding that online retailers with high market shares, e.g., Amazon.com, actually charged 
higher prices (suggesting that trust and brand loyalty are important in Internet trade and 
that these cause heterogeneity among online retailers); in fact, the Internet seems to 
strengthen the importance of trust and loyalty. 
 
Apart from the reason of retailer heterogeneity, Internet retailers may charge higher 
prices to uninformed customers. It is unclear whether the price dispersion caused by 
heterogeneities arising from information asymmetry and customer loyalty will hold in 
equilibrium. Thus, whether Internet prices are lower than physical market prices is an 
empirical question rather than a theoretical one. These imply that though there is lower 
friction in Internet trade, it is not frictionless as claimed.  
 
2.2.1.5 Business to Consumer E-Commerce 
 
Bakos (2001) examines the likely impact of e-commerce on Business to Consumer (B2C) 
commerce. Retail e-commerce is increasing, but some goods are more dominant than 
others. The projected shares of different product categories in total online retail sales for 
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2005 for the U.S. are as follows: consumables (health and beauty aids, general supplies, 
beverages, etc.), 18%; apparel, 16%; computers and electronics, 12.4%; automobiles, 
12.2%; leisure travel, 12.1%; books, music, videos, and software, 9.6%. 
 
When searching for goods, buyers incur opportunity costs of time spent, cost of travel to 
stores, magazine costs, etc. Sellers incur costs in finding buyers (e.g., market research, 
advertising, sales calls, etc.). Search engines such as Google, price comparison agents 
such as Pricewatch, and agents such as R-U-sure.com that monitor consumer behaviour 
to find the right product at the right price help reduce buyer search costs. The cost of 
acquiring information about sellers also is reduced by agents such as eBay or Bizrate. 
Seller search costs are reduced by cost-effective communication of product information, 
targeted advertising, one-on-one marketing, etc. 
 
Lower buyer search costs encourage price competition. Online markets may have lower 
entry costs or smaller efficient scales, leading to many sellers in equilibrium with lower 
prices and profits. Online buyers expect discounts in the range of 20 to 30 per cent for 
items priced $30 to $500. The “friction-free” market dynamics are not favourable to 
sellers. Since products are not truly homogenous, sellers may resort to differentiation to 
offset lower profits due to lower buyer search costs. Online product differentiation and 
offerings are facilitated because physical shelf space is not required. Information-rich 
products lend themselves to cost-effective customization. Customization is facilitated by 
technologies that track the behaviour of consumers. Merchants may also create high 
switching costs by using superior user interfaces, offering desired products based on 
knowledge about customers, etc. Generally, online buyers have less price sensitivity. 
However, sellers may not have a greater ability to charge a premium, since buyers have 
been found to shop at Amazon.com and then actually buy at lower-priced Buy.com. 
Customer information, the ability to differentiate products, and lower menu costs mean 
an increased ability to price-discriminate. This ability may offset price competition 




New price discovery mechanisms, e.g. new types of auctions, are employed in e-
commerce. These mechanisms may help to obtain more efficient markets, in some cases 
improving welfare in general. But an efficient market does not result when information 
asymmetry is present. When sellers are better informed, they may increase profits 
through price discrimination. Electronic markets usually emphasize product information 
rather than price information, in the interest of sellers. The new patterns of price 
discovery change the market microstructure, that is, how prices are set by buyers and 
sellers. The microstructure affects both value creation and distribution.  
 
New types of intermediaries develop in e-commerce markets. These intermediaries help 
online markets mainly by aggregating services and products. Distribution is likely to be 
transformed, especially for information goods. In the case of tangible goods (e.g., Dell 
computers), traditional intermediaries such as wholesalers may be eliminated. However, 
new types of intermediaries develop even in the case of tangible goods (e.g., FedEx and 
UPS, who have expertise in logistics and have economies of scale). In short, 
intermediaries that provide physical inventory will disappear and those that provide 
information services will flourish. 
 
In the case of information goods, lower transaction costs result in new strategies such as 
bundling, site licensing, and per-use fees. These are basically strategies of aggregating or 
disaggregating. Aggregating a large number of information goods produces higher profits 
to sellers and a wider distribution of goods to buyers. Aggregation may change the shape 
of the demand curve. When the valuations of goods are not perfectly correlated, the 
average valuation of the bundle is usually around the mean valuation. Hence, bundling 
and pricing the bundle just below the mean can result in higher profits to sellers and 
greater total welfare. This strategy also reduces dead-weight loss, when the marginal cost 
is very low. Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) promote creation of content, but 
limitations imposed by IPR increase the dead-weight loss and reduce social welfare. 
However, on the whole, retail e-commerce is likely to increase social welfare through 
lower prices, more choices, lower “fit costs,” and first-order increase in welfare from 
 13 
product offerings. Even price discrimination may increase social welfare by increasing 
the number of buyers. 
 
2.2.2 Social Impacts of the Internet  
 
Shah, Kwak, and Holbert (2001) investigate the relationship between Internet use and the 
individual-level production of social capital. They analyze the predictive power of new 
media use using 1999 DDB Life Style Study data. They find that the informational uses 
of the Internet are positively related to differences in the production of social capital; that 
socio-recreational uses are negatively related; and that social capital production is related 
to use among generation X.  
 
2.2.3 Behavioural Impacts of the Internet 
 
Stevenson (2003) studies behavioural impacts of the Internet in the context of job search 
by unemployed and employed persons who wish to change jobs. Stevenson uses the state 
average ownership rates of household appliances in 1960 as instrument to explain the 
adoption pattern in various states in the U.S. and finds that, in states that adopted the 
Internet rapidly, the unemployed have increased their job searches. The research also 
finds that the employed also seem to have increased their job search for changing jobs.  
 
2.2.4 Geography and Impacts of the Internet 
 
Pohjola (2002) reviewed the literature and analyzed WITSA and WBDI data to study the 
New Economy, characterized by the Internet and globalization, with respect to its various 
facts, its impacts, and public policy implications. He observes that people in rich 
countries, having the required infrastructure and skills, are in a much better position to 





2.3 Diffusion of the Internet and Applications 
 
2.3.1 Diffusion of Technologies 
 
Griliches (1957), in his seminal study of diffusion of innovations, analyzed the factors 
responsible for cross-sectional differences in the rates of use of hybrid seed corn in the 
U.S. He fit logistic growth functions to data and interpreted the differences among areas 
as differences in the estimates of origins, slopes, and ceilings (which in turn are explained 
by different economic factors that are characteristic of areas). Through this study, he 
showed that the process of innovation, the process of adapting and distributing a 
particular invention, and the rate at which it is accepted by entrepreneurs are amenable to 
economic analysis. 
 
Saloner and Shepard (1995) studied time until adoption of technologies with network 
effects in the context of banks’ adoption of ATMs. They first develop a theoretical 
framework for the relationship between network size and (banks’) propensity to adopt 
(ATMs). They then use different standard duration models (Weibull, log-logistic, and 
non-parametric Cox partial likelihood estimator) for empirical tests. They use data from 
FDIC and from Hannan and McDowell (1987) surveys. They find that the number of 
branches (ATM locations) increases the propensity to adopt early, consistent with the 
presence of a “network effect.” 
 
Banerjee (1992) analyzes sequential decision making in which each decision maker looks 
at the decisions made by previous decision makers in taking his or her own decision 
(“herd behaviour”) through a game-theoretic model with Bayesian-Nash equilibrium. He 
theorizes that people will do what others are doing rather than use their own information 
and that the resulting equilibrium is inefficient. We may interpret from this result, in 
terms of adoption by households, that the situation of each household is different and 
known only to the household; and that households will adopt the Internet whatever their 
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situations may be, if adoption is high in their neighbourhood, resulting in inefficient 
equilibrium5.  
 
Geroski (2000), in a survey of technology diffusion models, reviews the common S-curve 
generating models, epidemic and probit, and argues for two alternate models, competition 
and information cascades. He identifies new implications for public policy based on the 
alternative models. Hall (2004), in her study of determinants of diffusion, and modeling 
strategies, provides a historical and comparative review of determinants and a non-
technical review of modeling strategies. She advocates the real options approach as a 
promising modeling avenue. The real options approach would naturally yield a hazard 
rate/waiting time model and an S-shaped cumulative distribution, while explicitly 
incorporating uncertainties of decisions.    
 
2.3.2 Determinants of Internet Use 
 
2.3.2.1 Socio-Economic Determinants of Internet Use and the Digital Divide 
 
Venkatesh and Brown (2001) identify drivers of technology adoption in homes through a 
nationwide, two-wave, longitudinal investigation of factors driving personal computer 
adoption in U.S. homes. Their research found that adopters of technology were driven by 
utilitarian, hedonic, and social outcomes whereas non-adopters were influenced by rapid 
changes in technology and the fear of obsolescence. They also found an asymmetrical 
relationship between intent and behaviour in connection with adoption decisions.  
 
Kiiski and Pohjola (2002)’s research looked for factors that determine the diffusion of the 
Internet across countries. Using the Gompertz model of technology diffusion and data on 
hosts per capita for 1995-2000, they found that, for a sample of OECD countries, the per 
capita gross domestic product and Internet access cost best explain the growth in 
computer hosts per capita; however, investment in education is not a significant predictor.  
For a larger sample of industrial and developing countries, education also becomes a 
significant factor. 
                                                 
5 The resulting equilibrium in such cases is inefficient because it reduces welfare.  
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Sexton et al. (2002) analyzed a wide range of variables to identify accurate predictors of 
Internet and e-commerce use among individuals. With the aid of survey research and a 
neural network model, they found that a person’s gender, overall computer usage, job-
related use of the Internet, and access to the Internet from home are important influences 
of the use of the Internet and e-commerce.  
 
Mills and Whitacre (2003) studied the gap between home Internet use in metropolitan 
areas and non-metropolitan areas in the U.S. They used data from the 2001 U.S. Current 
Population Survey and modeled the household Internet adoption decision using a logit 
estimation approach. Decomposing the estimates for metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
areas, they found that differences in household attributes, especially education and 
income, account for 63% of the digital divide between metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
areas.  
 
Hoffman and Novak (1999) surveyed the literature and used data from various sources to 
study the digital divide among sections of American society. They found that the digital 
divide between Whites and African Americans is growing and that differences in the 
levels of education, income and wealth, and gender also contribute to the digital divide6.  
 
2.3.2.2 Behavioural Determinants of Internet Use 
 
Kraut et al. (1998) researched the relative importance of alternative uses of the Internet in 
households, especially communication and information-related uses. In the research, they 
treated the use of email as related to interpersonal communication and the use of World-
Wide Web (WWW) as related to information acquisition and entertainment. They 
analyzed data from a longitudinal survey of 229 individuals in their first year of using the 
Internet. The research showed interpersonal communication to be a stronger driver of 
Internet use than are information and entertainment applications. 
 
                                                 
6 In our research, we do not study household e-buying from the racial perspective.  
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 Goolsbee and Klenow (2002) researched the importance of local spillover (such as 
network externalities and learning from others) in the diffusion of home computers. 
Using a linear probability model and instrument variables estimation, they analyzed data 
on 110,000 U.S. households in 1997 and found that people are more likely to buy their 
first home computer in areas where a high fraction of households already own computers 
or when a large share of their family and friends own computers; that the spillovers 
appear to come from experienced and intensive computer users; that the spillovers are not 
associated with use of any particular software, but seem to be tied to the use of email and 
the Internet. 
 
Shih and Fang(2004) attempt to identify behavioural factors that can predict Taiwanese 
bank customers’ intention to adopt  banking. They analyze data collected from 425 
respondents, using models of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) and the Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA). They use structural equation modeling for the empirical 
analysis. They find that attitudes towards Internet banking influence adoption 
significantly, whereas subjective norms (that is, what individuals think others would 
expect or do) do not. Intention to adopt is in turn a significant determinant of actual 
adoption. The authors reach this conclusion from both models, TPB and TRA. In our 
opinion, these results suggest that income, education, and age levels might be among 
factors influencing household online buying. Households with lower incomes, lower 
levels of education, and aged people may not have a favourable attitude towards online 
banking or buying.   
  
Cheong and Park (2005) researched factors that promote the use of the Mobile Internet 
(M-Internet). They developed hypotheses from the literature on the Technology 
Acceptance Model (TAM) and empirically tested them using survey data obtained from 
1279 respondents in Korea. They found that individuals’ attitudes towards the service, 
their perception of M-Internet’s “playfulness,”7 and its usefulness are significant 
predictors of their intention to adopt the M-Internet.  
                                                 
7 Cheong and Park (2005) use the phrase “perceived playfulness” to mean how entertaining the Mobile 
Internet is.  
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In this section, we review some literature on the determinants of Internet use and its 
applications in organizations.  The objective is to compare these determinants to those 
suggested by the literature on individuals’ adoption of the Internet.     
 
Chwelos, Benbasat, and Dexter (2001) surveyed the research and diverse sets of models 
of EDI adoption by organizations, developed a compact model by synthesizing these 
models, collected survey data, and conducted the first empirical test of their model. The 
model hypothesizes that external pressure, readiness, and perceived benefits are the three 
fundamental determinants of EDI adoption by organizations. In developing their model, 
the authors hypothesized that H1: Higher perceived benefits will lead to greater intent to 
adopt EDI; H2: Higher external pressure will lead to greater intent to adopt EDI; and 
H3: Higher readiness will lead to greater intent to adopt EDI.  The model is tested by 
structural equation modeling, with data collected through a survey of a sample of senior 
purchasing managers (N = 268) throughout Canada.  
  
The authors used the Partial Least Squares (PLS) statistical analysis technique. Intent to 
adopt was the dependent variable. The findings support the hypotheses. The independent 
constructs -  Perceived benefits, readiness, and external pressure -  all positively relate to 
the intent to adopt EDI at the p < 0.001 level. Approximately 32% of the variance in 
intent to adopt is accounted for by the three constructs (R2= 0.318). The path coefficients 
range from 0.11 to 0.37, with the two paths from readiness and external pressure to 
intent to adopt above the suggested minimum of 0.2. These imply that the fit of the model 
is significant and that the two constructs, external pressure and readiness, are more 
important than perceived benefits, but that all three constructs are significant 
determinants of EDI adoption.  
 
Forman (2005) researched Internet adoption decisions in organizations (joint decisions of 
basic access and applications such as e-commerce). The research built on hypotheses 
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from prior results and used discrete choice analysis (nested logit model) to test the 
hypotheses with data from Harte Hanks Computer Intelligence Technology Database for 
the years 1996-98. It was found that the two technologies, access and applications, 
diffused at different rates (the latter being much slower); that prior investments in 
Information Technologies (IT) affect  adoption decisions (some may affect negatively by 
acting as short-term substitutes, or through a “lock-in” effect); and that geographic 
dispersion of employees, organizational size, and external pressure increase the 
likelihood of adoption.  
 
2.3.2.4 Taxes, and Internet and E-Commerce Adoption 
 
Consumers find incentives to engage in e-commerce in other, albeit non-economic, areas. 
Customers incur effectively less sales tax when they buy online. This section deals with 
the literature on e-commerce and taxes. The Economist (January, 2000) carried a survey 
on globalization and tax. Matthew Bishop investigated if consumers will pay less tax in 
the future, as globalization is accelerated by the Internet. Globalization means the gradual 
fusing of national markets into a single world market. The Internet reduces the relevance 
of being in a particular location and enhances the pace of globalization, making it more 
difficult for governments to collect taxes. The Internet also makes it relatively easy to 
break the law and evade taxes.  
 
Current tax systems rely on knowing where a particular economic activity is located. In 
the U.S., companies without sufficient “nexus” in a state are not legally obliged to collect 
sales tax. Online buyers are required to pay a “use tax” equal to the sales tax, but they 
hardly ever do. Online sellers such as Amazon.com have not bothered to remind their 
customers about the use tax. Less affluent members of society without access to the 
Internet cannot take advantage of Internet buying. Even traditional retail companies have 
attempted to spin off their Internet sales divisions into separate companies to take 
advantage of the Internet. Traditional retailers may convert their check-out counters to 
Internet terminals where the customers can “order” online what they picked from the 
shelves, if proposals to make Internet selling tax free take effect. Taxing Internet sales 
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will become much less acceptable if consumers become accustomed to tax-free Internet 
buying. Taxing individuals is also becoming more difficult. For example, capital, if not 
people themselves, moves to tax havens easily in the Internet-influenced globalized 
world, thereby decreasing tax revenues from interest income and capital gains. 
  
Cline and Neubig (1999) investigate if U.S. state and local tax revenues have eroded with 
the growth of e-commerce. Interstate sales are not subject to sales or use-tax collection by 
companies without nexus, as per U.S. Supreme court rulings. Most services and 
intangibles are not subject to such tax anyway. Some goods, such as groceries and 
prescription drugs, are also exempt in many states. Taxable sales through the Internet are 
subject to use tax payable by buyers, but governments do not enforce the collection of 
this tax. As of 1998, B2C Internet sales were only $20 billion or 0.3% of total consumer 
spending. The estimated revenue loss is only $170 million or 0.1% of total state and local 
sales and use tax collections. About 80% of e-commerce is Business to Business (B2B), 
which is generally tax exempt or effectively subject to use-tax payments.  About 63% of 
current e-commerce B2C sales relate to intangible services (e.g., travel and financial 
services) or exempt goods such as groceries that are not generally subject to state or local 
taxes. About 60% of e-commerce sales are those that would otherwise have evaded tax 
through telephonic sales or mail order sales and hence do not constitute fresh revenue 
loss. Thus, it is estimated that only about 13% of all or about one third of taxable e-
commerce sales have tax collection issues.  
 
Goolsbee (2000) tries to determine if taxes influence the Internet buying decisions of 
individuals. With controls for various buyer characteristics, the results suggest that online 
users in high sales-tax locations are more likely to buy over the Internet8. The author 
estimates that the number of online buyers would drop by as much as 24% if sales taxes 
were applied to online purchases. The tax sensitivity of sales has always been significant, 
with elasticity as high as 5 or 6, independent of the Internet, as is observed from the 
buying behaviour of people residing near state borders. Internet commerce has similar 
                                                 
8 A buyer may not pay tax in an online purchase; if he or she goes instead to a local store to buy the same 
good, he or she will pay sales tax.  
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characteristics as traditional commerce in cross-border locations. An earlier survey 
conducted nationally for Forrester Research, Massachusetts involved 110,000 U.S. 
households. The author uses the data pertaining to about 25,000 of these that had online 
access.  
 
A probit model estimates the probability that an individual with online access will buy 
over the Internet, as a function of the sales tax rate and various controls such as income, 
education, age, ethnicity, child/adult, marital status, gender, access to computer, running 
one’s own business or not, etc. With regards to the sales tax, the more likely an individual 
is to buy over the Internet, the greater the ratio Ps(1+t)/Pi is, where Ps is the store price, t 
is the sales tax and Pi is the price over the Internet. It is assumed that the relative price, 
Ps/Pi, is constant across locations. The dependent variable becomes a function of (1+t) 
and other control variables. The sign of the coefficient of the variable (1+t) is anticipated 
to be significantly positive.  
 
The results suggest that the mean probability of buying over the Internet, conditional on 
having Internet access, is 20.3%. The sales tax is found to have significant impact on the 
decision to buy online. Raising the tax by 0.01 increases the mean probability by 0.005, 
implying that the elasticity of online buying with respect to tax price (1+t) is 2.3. All the 
control variables, except ethnicity, are also generally significant. The mean frequency of 
use is found to be 16.7 days per month. It is also found that higher sales taxes do not 
make an individual more likely to obtain online access or own a computer. It is found 
also that taxes do not influence buying decisions on products that proxy for technological 
sophistication. 
 
2.4 Summary of Literature 
 
The impacts of the Internet are primarily economic and involve trade. For example, the 
Internet impacts the marketplace through reduced buyer search costs (Bakos, 1997). 
Buyers gain also from rent redistribution through lower prices, in addition to the social 
benefits of lower search costs and better matching of buyers and sellers. The earliest 
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effect of the Internet on markets is incremental and is basically cost reduction. In due 
course, drastic shifts arise:  through e-commerce, we can restructure business (Borenstein 
and Saloner, 2001). The Internet creates value by greatly reducing the cost of transferring 
information. If the product is itself information, the possibilities for value creation are 
tremendous. Value is created either on the cost side or on the demand side. On the 
demand side, improved matching of supplier and buyer occurs through improved 
information, better access to goods, and ease of customization. Still, issues of fit, feel, 
quality, and real appearance of goods remain. Automated e-commerce incorporates 
personalization technologies that track an online buyer, identify his or her preferences, 
recommend products, and permit customization (Vulkan, 2003).  This ability of sellers 
can blunt the buyer’s price comparison ability, thereby enabling the seller to engage in 
“dynamic pricing” and charge a different and usually higher price. However, the buyer 
also has software to help him or her. In effect, the individual consumer becomes a 
separate market of his or her own that many firms compete to capture. The resulting 
dynamics are complex, so how value is distributed is difficult to predict. Brynjolfsson 
and Smith (2000) find that trust and brand loyalty are important in Internet trade and that 
these cause heterogeneity among online retailers. In fact, the Internet seems to strengthen 
the importance of trust and loyalty. Price is generally lower in Internet trade, suggesting 
that the Internet lowers costs. Apart from the reason of retailer heterogeneity, Internet 
retailers may charge higher prices to uninformed customers. It is unclear whether the 
price dispersion caused by heterogeneities arising from information asymmetry and 
customer loyalty will hold in equilibrium. Thus, whether Internet prices are lower than 
physical market prices is an empirical question, rather than a theoretical one. Retail e-
commerce, on the whole, is likely to increase social welfare through lower prices, more 
choices, lower “fit costs,” first-order increase in welfare from product offerings, etc. Even 
price discrimination may increase social welfare by increasing the number of buyers 
(Bakos, 2001).  
 
Because of numerous positive impacts, the Internet has diffused widely and rapidly. The 
process of innovation, the process of adapting and distributing a particular invention, and 
the rate at which it is accepted by entrepreneurs are amenable to economic analysis 
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(Griliches, 1957). The diffusion of the Internet as an innovation is thus amenable to 
analysis and there has been considerable research on the topic. The Internet is a network. 
In a study of the adoption of ATMs by banks, Saloner and Shepard (1995) find that the 
number of branches (ATM locations) increases the propensity to adopt early, consistent 
with the presence of “network effect.” Thus, in the case of the Internet, when the number 
of nodes (that is, computers connected to the Internet) increases, further adoption of the 
Internet would gain even greater momentum. Similarly, “herd behaviour” (Banerjee, 
1992) implies that further adoption of the Internet will quicken when more and more 
individuals adopt the technology. The diffusion of technologies has been primarily 
modeled with S-Curve, first proposed by Griliches (1957). Alternate models have also 
been advocated by researchers (e.g., Geroski, 2000; Hall, 2004) to explain diffusion of 
technologies. The estimation of parameters of S-Curve or similar models leads us to the 
study of fundamental factors that drive adoption of technologies by users. As a result, 
there has been considerable research on the determinants of Internet use.  
 
The determinants of Internet use have been studied from socio-economic, behavioural, 
and other points of view. Venkatesh and Brown (2001) found that adopters of personal 
computers in homes were driven by utilitarian, hedonic, and social outcomes but that 
non-adopters were influenced by rapid changes in technology and the fear of 
obsolescence. Kiiski and Pohjola (2002) found that the per capita gross domestic product 
and Internet access cost explain best the growth in computer hosts per capita in OECD 
countries, and these factors and investment in education explained the same in a broader 
sample of countries. Sexton et al. (2002) found that a person’s gender, overall computer 
usage, job-related use of the Internet, and access to the Internet from home are important 
influences of the use of the Internet and e-commerce. Mills and Whitacre (2003) found 
that differences in household attributes, especially education and income, account for 
63% of the digital divide between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas. Hoffman and 
Novak (1999) found that the digital divide between Whites and African Americans is 
growing and that differences in the levels of education, income and wealth, and gender 
also contribute to the digital divide. Kraut et al. (1998) showed interpersonal 
communication to be a stronger driver of Internet use than are information and 
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entertainment applications. Goolsbee and Klenow (2002) found that people are more 
likely to buy their first home computer in areas where a high fraction of households 
already own computers or when a large share of their family and friends own computers, 
and that computer adoption seems to be tied to the use of email and the Internet . Shih 
and Fang (2004) find that individuals’ attitudes towards online banking influences 
significantly their intention to adopt it, while subjective norms (that is, what individuals 
think others would expect or do) do not. Intention to adopt is in turn a significant 
determinant of actual adoption. Cheong and Park (2005) found that individuals’ attitudes 
towards the service, their perception of the M-Internet’s playfulness, and its usefulness 
are significant predictors of their intention to adopt the M-Internet.  
 
Chwelos, Benbasat, and Dexter (2001) found external pressure faced by firms and their 
readiness to adopt technologies to be more important than the perceived benefits of 
technologies. Forman (2005) found that  access and applications diffused at different 
rates (the latter being much slower); that prior investments in information technologies 
(IT) affect  adoption decisions; and that external pressure, among other factors, increases 
the likelihood of adoption. 
 
Finally, researchers have also explored whether taxes are a determinant of Internet 
adoption decisions by individuals. The Economist (January, 2000) highlighted that 
globalization driven by the Internet has led to loss of tax revenues to governments. 
Online buyers are supposed to pay “use tax” in place of “sales tax,” but they rarely do. 
Borenstein and Saloner (2001) state that online buyers enjoy effectively lower taxes. 
Cline and Neubig (1999) argue that tax-loss due to online trade is not as large a loss of 
tax revenue as it is generally believed to be. Goolsbee (2000), however, found that online 
buyers are sensitive to these tax issues but still will not buy computers or subscribe to 
Internet services simply because of the effective lower taxes in online buying. That is, 









Data collected by Statistics Canada through its Household Internet Use Survey (HIUS) 
from 1997 -  2003 show that the level of online or electronic buying (e-buying) activity 
by Canadian households steadily increased over the period. Obviously, not all consumers 
adopted e-buying equally when presented with the technological opportunity of e-buying. 
Although the maturity of the electronic marketplace and the state of technology affect 
how conducive it is for consumers to adopt e-buying, individual consumer-specific 
factors such as age, education, and income probably play a role in e-buying adoption 
decisions. The individual-specific factors may explain why some consumers e-buy but 
others do not. To explore factors that influence e-buying adoption by the public, we chose 
as our research question, “how does e-buying intensity vary across age groups, gender, 
education levels, income levels, and the nature of goods?” We first develop a simple 
theoretical model9 that leads us to some hypotheses concerning the above question.  
 
For our theoretical model, we start with the premise that individuals maximize their 
utility. An individual consumer makes a purchase when he gains positive utility from 
doing so. Utility arises from the good’s specific nature (the quality parameter). But utility 
from the same good varies from consumer to consumer because of individual-specific 
factors (the taste parameter). Costs associated with a purchase, such as the price of the 
good and search costs, reduce the utility of purchase. If we were to consider the 
possibility of e-buying a good to the possibility of conventionally buying the good from a 
local store, we may associate different utilities to the consumer. We may then say that a 
consumer will e-buy rather than conventionally buy if the utility of e-buying is greater. 
The overall demand for a good will depend on population and the distribution of the taste 
parameter. Our theoretical model will thus have a quality parameter, taste parameter, and 
                                                 
9 The model is adapted from Tirole (1989), chapter 2. 
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costs (such as price and search cost), among others, as variables that explain e-buying 
demand.  
 
The HIUS data, which we wish to use for the empirical tests, have variables such as 
individual-specific (or household-specific) details such as age group, gender, and 
education level of the heads of the households, household income levels, type of Internet 
connection, whether the households ordered any good online in the past twelve months, 
the type of goods ordered, and if so, the number of orders placed and their dollar value. 
We can group goods ordered into two broad types: homogeneous and heterogeneous. 
Thus, in the HIUS datasets we have data pertaining to the quality parameter for a good, 
the taste parameter from the individual or household-specific factors, and search costs 
from the type of Internet connection. With this background, we develop hypotheses to 
explain overall e-buying adoption by households. 
 




We develop our simple model to explain, with certain assumptions, total e-buying 
demand of a specific good from a population of individual consumers. There are N 
households in a population. Each household represents one consumer. A consumer buys 
one unit of the good. He or she has a choice of buying it either through the Internet (e-
buying) or in a local store (non-ebuying)10.  
 
A good’s quality parameter is defined as s. Through this parameter s, we differentiate a 
homogeneous good from a heterogeneous one. When a consumer buys a good in a store, 
he or she can physically inspect the good, feel it, smell it, and determine its visual appeal. 
                                                 
10 A consumer who e-buys may do so either through his or her home connection or from outside locations 
such as a public library, workplace, university, or café, though most Canadian households access the 
Internet through their home connections. For example, out of the total sample of 23113 Canadian 
households of the HIUS 2003, 11868 had some kind of connection and 14159 used the Internet in a typical 
month from any location.  
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When e-buying the good, the customer cannot physically inspect it. He or she can 
ascertain online the quality to some extent of the good, subject to the limitations of online 
verifying. Thus, we assume that the quality parameter of a good bought online, 
designated se, cannot exceed the quality parameter of a good bought in a local store, 
designated sn. However, the difference between se and sn can be practically zero in the 
case of homogeneous goods such as a book or a music CD.  
 
A buyer is almost as sure of the quality of a homogeneous good when he or she e-buys it 
as he or she would be when conventionally buying it in a local store. Hence we have  
se ˜  sn for homogeneous goods. In the case of heterogeneous goods such as flowers, 
beauty products, clothing, jewellery, and real estate, a buyer is likely to be less sure of the 
quality of the good when he or she e-buys it than he or she would be when buying it 
through conventional means. Hence we assume that se < sn for heterogeneous goods.  
Thus we have assumed that the quality of heterogeneous goods can be ascertained only 
by physical contact whereas the quality of homogeneous goods can be verified indirectly 
through the Internet11. The parameter s captures this aspect and is thus a measure of how 
confident a consumer feels about the quality of the good in a particular purchase. The 
quality parameter s in turn may be a function of, apart from the good’s degree of 
homogeneity, several factors such as seller’s reputation, whether the good is branded or 
not, the buyer’s risk attitude, and the transaction value. We are, however, not concerned 
with these other factors in our simple model. 
 
For a given value of the quality parameter s from a purchase of a good, two consumers 
will derive different amounts of utility, due to differences in individual tastes. We capture 
the taste differences through a taste parameter designated as θ. Consequently, a 
consumer’s taste parameter is θ, which varies by consumer. Individual taste differences 
may arise due to individual-specific factors such as age, gender, education, and income. 
The parameter θ  captures these differences. The utility derived by a consumer from a 
purchase is θ se, the product of the taste parameter and the quality parameter. The taste 
                                                 
11 Homogeneous goods (for example, books or music CDs) do not call for rigorous inspection as 
heterogeneous goods do.  
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parameter θ  may be distributed in a population of consumers in a certain way. The 
distribution of θ  is F(θ ), the cumulative distribution function (CDF). At this stage we do 
not make any assumption about the type of distribution F(θ ). To elaborate on the taste 
parameter, if we consider an online purchase of a costly pen from the viewpoints of two 
consumers, this purchase may have different utilities to the two consumers, so one may 
buy it but the other may not. The purchase will likely be viewed equally by the two with 
respect to its quality parameter, but one consumer may not be able to afford it and hence 
he or she may not have developed a taste for such costly goods (income factor). 
Similarly, a particular overseas travel package may be more appealing to a woman than 
to a man (gender factor). A trip to a theme park may be more exciting to a child than to 
his or her parents (age factor). Other factors may contribute to differences in individual 
tastes for a good.     
 
A particular benefit of e-buying is the ease with which information about goods and 
sellers can be found by buyers. Information is often just a few clicks away. Electronic 
commerce has cost advantages over conventional commerce (Bakos, 1997, 2001; 
Borenstein and Saloner, 2001; Vulkan, 2003). A major source of cost reduction is 
reduced search cost. The lower search cost of e-buying enhances the utility derived from 
e-buying. We factor this aspect into our model through the effort parameter for 
information search a. The greater the cost of information search, the greater the value of 
a. We designate the effort parameter for information search of e-buying as ae and that of 
conventional buying as an.  
 
The Price of the good, which we designate as p, considerably reduces the utility of 
purchase to most consumers and hence influences the demand for the good. Price pn is the 
local price.  Some empirical evidence suggests that online prices, which we designate as 
pe, are lower than conventional market prices (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000). 
However, conflicting evidence suggests that online prices sometimes may be higher (e.g., 
Brynjolfsson and Smith, 2000) and that sellers may engage in dynamic and 
discriminatory pricing (e.g., Vulkan, 2003). Consistent with the literature, we designate 
prices of online and conventional purchases differently, and these prices may or may not 
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be equal. Additional transportation costs and effectively lower taxes are associated with 
online buying. The geographical market reach of electronic commerce may be 
considerably enhanced for tangible goods (Borenstein and Saloner, 2001) because greater 
transportation costs can be offset by other cost savings and a distant market reached. 
Since tax collection is difficult to enforce in electronic commerce, online buyers pay 
effectively lower sales taxes (e.g., Economist, January 2000). These issues of 
transportation costs and tax affect the effective price of online purchases; hence, our 
variable for the price of e-buying, pe, includes transportation costs and excludes tax (in 
some cases). Although the online price includes additional transportation costs, it can still 
be competitive due to a larger number of suppliers (resulting from the extended 
geographic market reach of electronic commerce, which is consistent with the evidence 




Let Ue and Un be the utilities derived by a consumer from an online purchase and a 
conventional purchase (in a store) of a certain good. Then we have 
 
(301) Ue = θ se – pe – ae 
(302) Un = θ sn – pn – an 
 
As described earlier, θ s is the positive utility from purchase; price p and search cost, 
characterized by the effort parameter of information search a, reduce the utility of 
purchase. Hence we have the above expressions (301) and (302) for the utilities of 
purchase U. The consumer will e-buy instead of buying in a store if  
 
(303) Ue > Un, or  
(304) Ue – Un = θ (se – sn) – (pe – pn) – (ae – an) > 0 
 




(305) U = θ s – p – a > 0, or 
(306) θ > [(p + a) / s] 
 
The higher the price advantage and the search cost advantage of e-buying, the more 
negative the numerator of the right-hand side of the above inequality12. The greater the 
certainty of the quality of the good bought online, the less negative the denominator. 
Thus, the above inequality (306) implies that even a consumer with a low taste for a good 
will e-buy if the online price and search cost are sufficiently low and the quality of the 
good bought online is sufficiently certain.  
 
There are N households (i.e., consumers) in the population, and consumers whose utility 
is greater than 0 or whose taste parameter is θ > [(p + a)/s] will demand the good. Thus, 
the demand function is  
 
(307) D(p) = N[1 – F(θ)], or 
(308) D(p) = N[1 – F((p + a)/s)] 
 
where D(p) is the demand for the good, F(θ) is the distribution of the taste parameter θ in 
the population, s is the quality parameter, and the other variables are as explained earlier. 
F(θ) represents the area under the distribution curve for values of taste between -8  and 
the taste parameter θ. This area is the proportion of the population that represents 
consumers with taste for the good below the taste parameter θ. These consumers will not 
e-buy the good. The area under the curve F(θ) lying on the right side of the vertical line  
x = θ represents the proportion of the population of consumers with taste for the good 
above the taste parameter θ. These consumers will e-buy the good. Thus, we find from 
(307), the demand function D(p), that the higher the taste parameter θ, the lower the 
demand for the good. Alternately, from (308), we find that the higher the price and cost 
                                                 
12 The numerator (p + a) represents the disadvantage of e-buying with respect to price and search cost; 
since e-buying is generally advantageous, (p + a) would often be negative. The numerator can also be 
interpreted more generally as a measure of the total cost advantage of e-buying, rather than as only a 
measure of price and search-cost advantages.  
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advantages of e-buying and lesser the uncertainty about the quality of the good bought 
online, the higher the demand for e-buying.  
 
3.3 Empirical Model 
 
3.3.1 The Implications of the Theoretical Model 
 
The demand function D(p), as expressed in (308), may be interpreted in terms of the 
variables for which data are available in the HIUS dataset (namely age, gender, 
education, and income), so we can use the HIUS dataset for empirical tests of the above 
model. Equation (308) essentially relates demand with the individual-specific taste 
parameter θ, which in turn is related to the expression [(p + a) / s]. The price p and 
search-cost advantage a affect individuals differently since their income levels are 
different. Some are very sensitive to price and costs, while others are not at all. The 
search-cost advantage a may be high for consumers with high-speed Internet connections 
at home. It may be high for those who are young since young people are probably more 
tech-savvy and adept at the use of computers and the Internet. It can also be high for 
consumers with higher levels of education. The quality parameter (gap) s may affect old 
consumers, less educated consumers, and low-earning consumers more than it affects 
others. Consequently, individual factors such as age, gender, education, and income may 
be reasonably considered as representing (or as proxies for) the individual-specific taste 
parameter.  
 
3.3.2 Literature and Proposed Theoretical Model  
 
At this point, it may be relevant to refer to the literature for consistency with the above 
reasoning. If we find consistency, we would have additional justification for the above 
reasoning and for hypotheses we develop subsequently for empirical tests. Kiiski and 
Pohjola (2002) find that per capita GDP and Internet access cost explain best the growth 
in computer hosts per capita in a sample of countries and that investment in education 
also is significant in a larger sample of countries. That is, income and education promote 
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use of the Internet. Sexton et al. (2002) find that gender, overall computer use, job-related 
use, and home access are important influences of Internet use and e-commerce. This 
finding suggests that age, gender, education, and income influence Internet use. Mills and 
Whitacre (2003) find that differences in household attributes, especially education and 
income, account for 63% of the digital divide between metropolitan and non-metropolitan 
areas in the U.S. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) find that trust and brand loyalty are 
important in online trades. This finding suggests that age probably influences Internet use 
since older people are likely to be more conscious of online security issues and hence 
more circumspect about online transactions.  
 
Borenstein and Saloner (2001) state that most customers value trustworthiness, after-sales 
support, etc. in online transactions, suggesting that age may be an important factor in 
Internet use. Pohjola (2002) observes that people in rich countries, having the required 
infrastructure and skills, are in a much better position to benefit from the Internet than 
people in poor countries are. From this observation, we can infer that income and 
education probably affect Internet use.  Hoffman and Novak (1999) observe that 
education, income/wealth, and gender contribute to the digital divide among races in the 
U.S. Shah, Kwak, and Holbert (2001) find that informational uses of the Internet are 
positively related to differences in production of social capital, which in turn is related to 
Internet use among generation X. That is, age is likely a factor influencing use of the 
Internet. Kraut et al. (1998) find that interpersonal communication influences use of the 
Internet. Anecdotal evidence suggests that online chatting is popular with very young 
people, suggesting that age may influence Internet use. Cheong and Park (2005) find 
empirically that perceived playfulness is one of the significant predictors of intention to 
adopt the M-Internet. This finding suggests that age probably influences Internet use. 
Venkatesh and Brown (2001) find that non-adopters of personal computers in U.S. homes 
are influenced by rapid changes in technology and the fear of obsolescence. Age, 
education, and income are probably reflected in the behaviour and attitudes of non-
adopters of technology. Consistent with the literature, it is reasonable to consider that 
consumer-specific factors such as age, gender, education, and income influence use of the 
Internet. 
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3.3.3 Development of Hypotheses 
 
Consistent with our reasoning from our theoretical model and the literature, we develop 
the following hypotheses for empirical tests: 
 
H1: The higher the education level of head of household13, the higher the level of e-
buying by household 
H2: The higher the level of household income, the higher the level of e-buying14 
H3: The level of e-buying is less for households with a female as the head of household 
H4: The older the head of household, the less the level of e-buying by household 
H5: The level of e-buying is greater for homogeneous goods than for heterogeneous 
goods15 
 
While Hypotheses H1 to H4 arise from our discussions in the earlier sections, we test 
Hypothesis H5 based on the assumption of our theoretical model that the quality 
parameter difference s is greater (that is, more negative) for heterogeneous goods. The 
greater this difference, the lesser is the demand as per our model of the demand function 




The following is the equation that we use for the empirical tests with three different sets 
of data: (1) e-buy ordered, but not paid for online, (2) e-buy ordered and paid for online, 
and (3) e-buy ordered, both paid for online and not paid for online. The tests were 
conducted for full samples16 and then for partial samples for which there was Internet 
                                                 
13 The survey data pertain to heads of households.  
14 Since, normally, the higher the income, the greater the consumption (and hence the higher the level of 
buying in general), our conclusions do not address whether if particularly high income consumers e-buy 
more than others do.  
15 Since we do not compare e-buying of homogeneous goods (relative to heterogeneous goods) to overall 
buying of homogeneous goods (relative to heterogeneous goods), our conclusions do not address whether 
households particularly e-buy one type of good more than they e-buy another type.  
16 For some samples the type of good ordered (homogeneous or heterogeneous) was suppressed in the 
public micro dataset. Such samples constitute less than 5% of the total set of samples and were excluded 
from estimations.  
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connection in the household17. The estimations are made for two types of regressions: 
Tobit and Poisson (epoisson). While both types were used for the estimations involving 
‘number of separate orders’ as the dependent variables, only the Tobit type was used for 
the estimations involving ‘estimated total cost (of purchases)’ as the dependent variable.  
 
3.3.4.1 Tobit Model 
(309) y = a + i
i
i x∑β  + µ 
where 
 
y is  (1) number of separate orders ordered online in the last 12 months, = 0 
 (2) estimated total cost, in Canadian dollars, of online purchases made in the last 
12 months, = 0 
 
i = 1, 2, …, 13 
 
x1 = 1 if a homogeneous good was ordered; 0 if not 
x2 = 1 if a heterogeneous good was ordered; 0 if not 
x3 = 1 if the age of the head of the household sample is of age group 2 (35 – 54 years); 0 
if not 
x4 = 1 if the age of the head of the household sample is of age group 3 (55 – 64 years); 0 
if not 
x5 = 1 if the age of the head of the household sample is of age group 4 (65 + ); 0 if not 
x6 = 1 if the head of the household sample is female; 0 if not 
x7 = 1 if the education level of the head of the household sample is high school or some 
college; 0 if not 
x8 = 1 if the education level of the head of the household sample is university degree; 0 if 
not 
                                                 
17 It may be noted that a household that has no Internet connection at home may still e-buy from a location 
outside home; this can be seen from, for example, the HIUS 2003 data.  
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x9 = 1 if the income level of the household sample is in the quartile 2; 0 if not18 
x10 = 1 if the income level of the household sample is in the quartile 3; 0 if not 
x11 = 1 if the income level of the household sample is in the quartile 4; 0 if not 
x12 = 1 if the type of the  connection of the household sample is a type other than a 
telephone line; 0 if not 
x13 = 1 if the household sample has no  connection; 0 if not 
µ = error term, normally distributed  
 
3.3.4.2 Poisson Regression Model 
 




e tt λλ −
 for Yt = 0,1,2,…and 




where Yt is y as in the Tobit model. The exponent of the right-hand side of (311) is akin 
to the right-hand side of (309). ?t is the parameter of the Poisson probability distribution 
that is influenced by the explanatory variables Xt, all of which are the same as in the 
Tobit model. This is a non-normal model, unlike the Tobit model since errors are not 
assumed to be normally distributed. We used this model for the empirical tests of the 
equations for the dependent variables ‘number of separate orders’ only, not for those 









                                                 
18 The income ranges for the quartiles increased over the years; the ranges for 2003 (1999) were for quartile 
1: < $ 24,001 (< $ 20001), quartile 2:   $ 24,001 - $ 43,999 ($ 20,001 - $ 35,999), quartile 3:  $ 44,000 - $ 
69,999 ($ 36,000 - $ 59,999), and quartile 4: $ 70,000 plus ($ 60,000 plus). 
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Chapter 4 
Data and Method 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Our research uses the Household Internet Use Survey (HIUS) datasets of Statistics 
Canada for empirical tests of the hypotheses. We need e-commerce data pertaining to the 
level of e-buying activity by households and types of goods ordered by households; 
demographic data such as age, gender, and education of individual consumers 
representing households; and technical data such as Internet connection type to carry out 
the necessary empirical tests. All these relevant data are contained in the HIUS data. The 
purpose of our empirical model is to test our hypotheses. Since one of our dependent 
variables, namely the ‘number of separate orders’ ordered, is count-type we use Tobit and 
Poisson regression techniques for estimations involving this dependent variable. The 
other dependent variable, namely the ‘estimated total cost (of purchases)’, is positive or 
zero but continuous (and not count-type), so we use only the Tobit regression technique 
for estimations involving this dependent variable.  
 
4.2 Data  
 
We empirically test our hypotheses using detailed data on the Internet activities of 
Canadian households, collected by the Science, Innovation, and Electronic Information 
Division of Statistics Canada for 1999 – 200319 through annual surveys known as the 
Household Internet Use Survey (HIUS)20. This survey reports on Canadians using the 
Internet and measures the extent of their use, location of use, frequency of use, and their 
reasons for using or not using the Internet. The HIUS has been conducted since1997 and 
has evolved to capture increasingly more detail. In 1999, data on electronic commerce (e-
commerce) from home were provided. The 2003 survey examined Canadian households’ 
access to the Internet at home, in the workplace, and other locations such as public 
                                                 
19 The data of 2002 were not used in the regressions due to issues (the variable “quartile” had values 0 to 9, 
instead of 1 to 4) 
20 Most of the content of this section is extracted from the HIUS 2003 User Guide published by Statistics 
Canada.  
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libraries, schools / universities, and Internet cafés. The collected data reveal relationships 
between Internet use and household income, location of use, and demographic factors 
such as age and education. The detailed questions dealing with household e-commerce 
that were introduced in 1999 was repeated each year thereafter until 2003. 
 
The objectives of the HIUS survey are, among others, to gain a better understanding of 
how Canadian households use the Internet, identify the types of Internet services used at 
home, find reasons for non-usage of the Internet, determine what factors would induce 
households to start using the Internet, understand the impact of the Internet on purchases 
of goods and services, etc. In assessing the use of the Internet, Statistics Canada has 
measured the accessibility of the Internet from different locations as well as the 
frequency and intensity of use from home.  
 
The HIUS survey datasets published by Statistics Canada contain data directly collected 
from the HIUS as well as data derived from another source: the Labour Force Survey 
(LFS). Demographic and employment data collected through the LFS were added to the 
HIUS household data.  The LFS and HIUS data were collected from the same 
households, but not all households surveyed for the LFS were surveyed for the HIUS. For 
example, the total number of households surveyed for the HIUS 2003 is 23,113 while that 
for the LFS is 34,674. The data were collected through computer-assisted telephone 
surveys.  
 
An important aspect of the HIUS to be noted for our empirical tests is the need to use 
population weights (provided through the variable WTHP). The weight applied to each 
observation is the total number of Canadian households represented by that sample. The 
regressions thus represent population estimates for the total number of households in 
Canada.  
 
The data are available through the Tri-University Data Resources (TDR) website or 
through the new Nesstar website. The old website is no longer updated, but the full HIUS 
datasets of years 1997 to 2003 are available under the data group “Communications.” 
 38 
Either a full set or a sub-sample of observations can be downloaded, based on categories 
such as province, gender, etc. Furthermore, all variables (columns that pertain to 





4.3.1 Tobit Regression 
 
If we were to use Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) for estimation of our empirical models, 
we may obtain coefficient estimates that are unrealistic to our Data Generating Process 
(DGP). Our DGP has dependent variables taking values of zero or positive real numbers, 
representing a limited dependent variable. The number of separate orders placed in a 
period cannot be negative. Furthermore, the total dollar value of transactions cannot be 
negative. Since the OLS estimate can return negative dependent variable values for a 
given set of coefficient estimates and a set of values for explanatory variables, its 
coefficients estimates are biased and inconsistent. For example, our initial tests used OLS 
and we obtained counter-intuitive results.  
 
Tobit regression is suitable to our requirement because it is specifically designed to 
account for a truncated sample.  It is a special type of probit model, propounded by 
economist Tobin (Tobin’s probit). It provides Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates. The 
structure of the Tobit model is as follows:  
 
Yt* = X’t ß + et 
Yt = 0  if Yt* = 0 
Yt = Yt*  if Yt* > 0 
 
A limit value other than zero can be specified, which is however unnecessary in our case; 
our limits for the number of orders and the dollar value of transactions are zero. In the 
above structure of the Tobit model, Yt* is a latent variable, not the dependent variable. Yt 
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is the dependent variable. The model returns estimates for coefficients of the explanatory 
variables such that the dependent variable’s estimate is always zero or positive, never 
negative. Since the Tobit model is an extension of the probit model, its error term e is 
normally distributed as is the error term of the probit model. The dependent variable’s 
estimate is a continuous value. Tobit models can be executed in SHAZAM using the 
command 
 
TOBIT depvar indeps /options 
 
where depvar is the dependent variable, indeps is a list of independent variables, and 
options is a list of desired options. The options WEIGHT= and NONORM21 applicable to 
the OLS procedure are also applicable to Tobit models. In our case, we have to use the 
weights of individual samples of the HIUS survey to generalize to the entire population. 
The option NONORM ensures that the weighting is not normalized so that weighting is 
for the purpose of replicating the samples. The option REPLICATE, which is applicable 
to OLS, is not valid for Tobit and is in fact unnecessary. The option NONORM is 
sufficient to ensure replication.  
 
The Tobit model is also known as a “censored regression model.” The censored model is 
applicable in two-stage decision situations. In our case, the first-stage decision for a 
household is whether to e-buy or not. If it decides to e-buy, it proceeds to the  
second-stage decision of how much to e-buy. Thus the Tobit model seems appropriate to 
our problem.  
 
4.3.2 Poisson Regression 
 
In our case, the dependent variable the ‘number of separate orders’ ordered in the last 
twelve months by a household, can take only count values, that is values 0,1,2,…, and so 
on. This dependent variable cannot take negative or fractional values. It takes only 
                                                 
21 With this option, SHAZAM does not normalize weights, since we weight in order to replicate the 
grouped survey data, not to correct for heteroskedasticity.   
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discrete positive values. Similar applications include the number of patents received by a 
firm in a year, the number of customers arriving at a bank teller every five minutes, etc. 
In such cases, the assumption of normally distributed error terms may be inappropriate22. 
The probability distribution specifically suited for count data is a Poisson probability 
distribution. Poisson regression does away with the assumption of normally distributed 
errors.  Hence it is a non-normal model; however, the mean of the distribution is equal to 
the variance. We use Poisson regression technique for the estimations involving the 
above dependent variable, in addition to Tobit technique.  
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The above model is called EPOISSON in SHAZAM and it is executed using the 
Maximum Likelihood Estimate (MLE) command as follows: 
 
MLE depvar indeps /TYPE=EPOISSON 
 
If  we use TYPE=POISSON, a different kind of Poisson regression in which  
 
?t = X’tß  
 
is used. In this case, the log-likelihood function is not defined for values of X’tß < 0. 
Hence, especially when we have negative X’tß, TYPE=EPOISSON is preferable to 
TYPE=POISSON. In our case, we have a large number of negative X’tß in almost all the 
estimations, so we use TYPE=EPOISSON23. Poisson regression has the OLS option 
                                                 
22 SHAZAM User’s Reference Manual, Version 10, p239. 
23 X’tß (or simply XBs) are products of the observed values of independent variables and their estimated 
coefficients. Thus an XB is the portion of the estimate of dependent variable that is explained by the 
independent variable X.  
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WEIGHT= and NONORM, which we use in our estimations since our data are grouped. 
Poisson regression does not have the REPLICATE option as OLS does, but the 


































This chapter summarizes in tabular form the estimation results with respect to individual 
hypotheses. These tables are in non-standard format, but help analyze the results against 
the hypotheses. Before reading these summary tables, please review the description of the 
variables, the descriptive statistics for the variables, and the regression results that are 
appended in standard format. Any notable points of the estimations are mentioned in the 
chapter. After the presentation of results, we analyze the same to draw conclusions about 
our hypotheses. We finally list the issues we have with our theoretical model and the 




5.2.1 Hypothesis I 
 
H1: The higher the education level of head of household, the higher the level of e-buying 
by household 
 
Table 5.2.1: Results of Hypothesis I 
Equation Sample Type of 
Regression 
EDU 224 EDU 3 Result 
125 Full Tobit26 0.637 ***        
0.808 
***        Not 
rejected27 
 
                                                 
24 EDU 1: Less than high school; EDU 2: High school or some college; and EDU 3: University degree. The 
equation skips EDU 1 and keeps the other two binary variables out of the three. Significance levels are: *** 
1%, ** 5%, and * 10%   
25 The equations are distinguished mainly with respect to the dependent variable as follows: Eq. 1 - number 
of separate orders, ordered online but not paid for online; Eq. 2 – estimated total cost of purchases, ordered 
online but not paid for online; Eq. 3 – number of separate orders, ordered online and paid for online; Eq. 4 
– estimated total cost of purchases, ordered online and paid for online; Eq. 5 – number of separate orders, 
ordered online (whether paid for online or not); and Eq. 6 – estimated total cost of purchases, ordered 
online (whether paid for online or not).  
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2 Full Tobit 177.3 ***        
294.1 
***        Not rejected 
 
3 Full Tobit 1.326 ***       1.76 ***       Not rejected 
4 Full Tobit 141.9 ***          263.3 ***          Not rejected 
5 Full Tobit 1.858 ***         2.407 ***         Not rejected 
6 Full Tobit 231.3 ***       391.9 ***       Not rejected 
1 Sub Tobit 0.153 ***       0.168 ***       Not rejected 
2 Sub Tobit 74.12        ***        
164.9        
***        Not rejected 
3 Sub Tobit 1.336        ***        
1.823        
***        Not rejected 
4 Sub Tobit 99.72        ***        
222.8        
***        Not rejected 
5 Sub Tobit 1.112        ***        
1.504        
***        Not rejected 
6 Sub Tobit 112.5        ***        
248.6        
***        Not rejected 
1 Full Poisson 0.091 ***    0.141     ***   Not rejected 
3 Full Poisson 0.205     ***   0.243     ***   Not rejected 
5 Full Poisson 0.238     ***   0.302     ***   Not rejected 
1 Sub Poisson 0.011 insig  0.040 insig  Reject 
3 Sub Poisson 0.183     ***  0.254     ***  Not rejected 
5 Sub Poisson 0.138     ***  0.200     ***  Not rejected 
 
 
The higher the education level, the higher the e-buying with e-pay, and the higher the e-
buying with or without e-pay (that is, overall e-buying). In the case of e-buying without 
e-paying (equation 1), such a relationship is rejected by Poisson regression on the sub-
samples. Those with higher levels of education may be willing to e-pay. The evidence, as 





                                                                                                                                                 
26 For Tobit regressions, we present regression coefficients, not normalized coefficients.   
27 If the coefficients of EDU3 and EDU2 are significant, and that of EDU3 is higher than that of EDU2, the 
hypothesis is not rejected; otherwise, it is rejected.  
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5.2.2 Hypothesis II 
 
H2: The higher the level of household income, the higher the level of e-buying 
Table 5.2.2: Results of Hypothesis II 
Equa- 
tion 
Sample Type of 
Regression 
QUART228 QUART3 QUART4 Result 
1 Full Tobit 0.389  ***       
1.095  
***       
0.588 
***        
Reject29 
2 Full Tobit 30.96 ***        
117.1 
***        
338.6 
***        
Not rejected 
3 Full Tobit 0.686 ***       1.126 ***       1.03 ***       Reject 
4 Full Tobit 97.23 ***          178.5 ***          331.7 ***          Not rejected 
5 Full Tobit 0.918 ***         1.773 ***         1.745 ***         Reject 
6 Full Tobit 113.7 ***       236.3 ***       478.2 ***       Not rejected 
1 Sub Tobit 0.095 *** 0.709 ***       0.321 ***       Reject 
2 Sub Tobit -19.6       *** 
33.19        
***        
283.2        
***        
Reject 
3 Sub Tobit 0.433        *** 
1.086        
***        
0.917        
***        
Reject 
4 Sub Tobit 78.23       *** 
181.7        
***        
337.7        
***        
Not rejected 
5 Sub Tobit 0.424        *** 
1.221        
***        
1.161        
***        
Reject 
6 Sub Tobit 60.04        *** 
164        
***        
409.6        
***        
Not rejected 
1 Full Poisson 0.16     ***   0.268     ***    
0.102     
***    Reject 
3 Full Poisson 0.169     ***    
0.176     
***   
0.237     
***    Not rejected 
5 Full Poisson 0.245     ***    
0.287     
***    
0.295     
***    Not rejected 
1 Sub Poisson 0.051 *  0.148     ***  
0.008 insig  Reject 
3 Sub Poisson 0.124     ***  
0.155     
***  
0.200     
***  Not rejected 
5 Sub Poisson 0.123     ***  
0.165     
***  
0.179     
***  Not rejected 
 
 
From the above results, we can observe the following with regard to Hypothesis H2: 
                                                 
28 QUART1: = $ 24,000; QUART2: $ 24,001 - $ 43,999; QUART3: $ 44,000 - $ 69,999; and QUART4: $ 
70,000 + 
29 If the coefficients of QUART2, QUART3, and QUART4 are significant and progressively higher in that 
order, the hypothesis is not rejected; otherwise, it is rejected.   
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1. For the full samples and the sub-samples, the Poisson regression results do not 
reject the hypothesis, in the case of number of separate orders ordered, for (a) e-
buy with e-pay and (b) e-buy with or without e-pay; but they reject the hypothesis 
for e-buy without e-pay. 
2. For the full samples, the Tobit regression results do not reject the hypothesis, in 
the case of the estimated total cost (of purchases). 
 
From the above, we can conclude that, across the entire population of households, the 
higher the income level, the higher the level of e-buying (in terms of dollar value).   
 
5.2.3 Hypothesis III 
 
H3: The level of e-buying is less for households with a female as the head of household 
 
Table 5.2.3: Results of Hypothesis III 
Equation Sample Type of 
Regression 
FEMALE Result 
1 Full Tobit -0.702  ***      Not 
rejected30 
2 Full Tobit -59.31 ***       Not rejected 
3 Full Tobit -0.751 ***      Not rejected 
4 Full Tobit -92.27 ***        Not rejected 
5 Full Tobit -0.894 ***        Not rejected 
6 Full Tobit -90.29 ***      Not rejected 
1 Sub Tobit -0.733 ***      Not rejected 
2 Sub Tobit -69.85       ***       Not rejected 
3 Sub Tobit -1.245       ***       Not rejected 
4 Sub Tobit -128.1       ***       Not rejected 
5 Sub Tobit -1.243       ***       Not rejected 
                                                 
30 If the coefficient of FEMALE is significant and negative, the hypothesis is not rejected; otherwise, it is 
rejected.  
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6 Sub Tobit -122.6       ***       Not rejected 
1 Full Poisson -0.331     ***    Not rejected 
3 Full Poisson -0.175     ***    Not rejected 
5 Full Poisson -0.225     ***    Not rejected 
1 Sub Poisson -0.35     ***  Not rejected 
3 Sub Poisson -0.279     ***  Not rejected 
5 Sub Poisson -0.275     ***  Not rejected 
 
 
Both the Poisson regression results and the Tobit regression results do not reject 
Hypothesis H3.  
 
5.2.4 Hypothesis IV 
 
H4: The older the head of household, the less the level of e-buying by household  
 
 
Table 5.2.4: Results of Hypothesis IV 
Equa- 
tion 
Sample Type of 
Regression 
AGE 231 AGE 3 AGE 4 Result 
1 Full Tobit -0.145 ***       
0.062 
***    
-1.288  
***      
Reject32 
2 Full Tobit -25.43 ***       
1.77   
insig      
-90.26 
***       
Reject 
3 Full Tobit -0.725 ***      -0.424 ***      -1.608 ***      Reject 
4 Full Tobit -90.54 ***         -53.71 ***   -160.2 ***        Reject 
5 Full Tobit -0.754 ***        -0.426 ***        -2.527 ***        Reject 
6 Full Tobit -86.91 ***      -65.87 ***      -251.3 ***      Reject 
1 Sub Tobit -0.039 ***   0.144 ***       -0.497 ***      Reject 
2 Sub Tobit 4.259        insig   
42.86        
***        
126.2        
***       
Reject 
                                                 
31 AGE 1: < 35 years; AGE 2: 35 – 54 years; AGE 3: 55 – 64 years; and AGE 4: 65 + years 
32 If AGE2, AGE3, and AGE4 are significant and progressively less in that order, the hypothesis is not 
rejected; otherwise, it is rejected.  
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3 Sub Tobit -0.623       ***   
-0.065   
***        
-1.0       
***       
Reject 
4 Sub Tobit -63.44       ***   
-20.11       
***        
-48.67       
***       
Reject 
5 Sub Tobit -0.497       ***   
0.109        
***        
-0.961       
***       
Reject 
6 Sub Tobit -40.70       ***   
24.70        
***        
9.496        
***       
Reject 
1 Full Poisson -0.150     ***    
-0.123     
***    
-0.492     
***    Reject 
3 Full Poisson -0.103     ***    
-0.087 ***   -0.24     
***    Reject 
5 Full Poisson -0.103     ***    
-0.074 ***   -0.335     
***    Reject 
1 Sub Poisson -0.128     ***  
-0.088 ***  -0.283     
***  Reject 
3 Sub Poisson -0.090 ***  -0.045 ***  -0.141     ***  Reject 
5 Sub Poisson -0.086 ***  -0.032 ***  -0.165     ***  Reject 
 
We may note from the above results that Hypothesis H4 is rejected. We may hence 
conclude that we do not find empirical evidence for the hypothesis that the older the head 
of household, the less the level of e-buying by household.  
 
5.2.5 Hypothesis V 
 









                                                 
33 We categorize different kinds of goods noted in the HIUS 2003 survey as either “homogeneous” or 
“heterogeneous” as follows: homogeneous goods – computer software, computer hardware, Music (CDs, 
tapes, and MP3), books and magazines, videos and DVDs, consumer electronics, and travel arrangements; 
heterogeneous goods – other entertainment products, “food, condiments, and beverages,” “health, beauty, 
and medical,” clothing and jewelry, house wares, automotive, flowers and gifts, sports equipment, toys and 
games, real estate, crafts and hobbies, other household related items, “other, , and renovations,” and “other, 
specify.” 
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Table 5.2.5: Results of Hypothesis V 
Equation Sample Type of 
Regression 
HOMOGENEOUS34 HETEROGENEOUS Result 
1 Full Tobit 19.72  ***       
20.56 
***        
Reject35 
2 Full Tobit 4121 ***        
4059  
***       
Not 
rejected 
3 Full Tobit 23.9  ***       
21.82 ***       Not 
rejected 
4 Full Tobit 3408 ***          2931  ***         Not 
rejected 
5 Full Tobit 22.31 ***          21.14 ***          Not 
rejected 
6 Full Tobit 3305 ***       2939 ***       Not 
rejected 
1 Sub Tobit 19.41 ***          
20.25 ***        Reject 
2 Sub Tobit 4092 ***        
4027 
***        
Not 
rejected 
3 Sub Tobit 22.73        ***   20.93        ***       Not 
rejected 
4 Sub Tobit 3252        ***   2791        ***       Not 
rejected 
5 Sub Tobit 21.63        ***   20.37        ***       Not 
rejected 
6 Sub Tobit 3225        ***   2844        ***      Not 
rejected 
1 Full Poisson 1.866     ***    3.033     ***    Reject 
3 Full Poisson 2.011     ***    2.103     ***    Reject 
5 Full Poisson 1.596     ***    1.954     ***    Reject 
1 Sub Poisson 1.834     ***  2.906     ***  Reject 
3 Sub Poisson 1.74     ***  1.916     ***  Reject 
                                                 
34 We include both the “homogeneous” and “heterogeneous” variables, since households may order both 
types of goods, so these two variables are not mutually exclusive. The actual names of the variables in the 
regressions are “homobuy” and “heterobuy” for equations 1 and 2, “homopay” and  “heteropay” for 3 and 
4, and “homogood” and “heterogood” for 5 and 6, respectively.  
35 If the coefficients of the variables HOMOGENEOUS and HETEROGENEOUS are significant and that 
of the former is more than that of the latter, the hypothesis is not rejected; otherwise, it is rejected.  
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5 Sub Poisson 1.547     ***  1.861     ***  Reject 
 
From the above results, we may note the following with regard to Hypothesis H5: 
1. For the full samples, which consist of almost the entire set of observations of the 
surveys, and the sub-samples, which consist of only the households with an 
Internet connection, the Tobit results do not reject the hypothesis, in the case of 
estimated total cost of orders in dollars.  
2. For the full samples and the sub-samples, the Poisson regression results reject 
Hypothesis H5 and the Tobit results are mixed, in the case of number of separate 
orders ordered online.  
 
Thus from the above empirical results, we find evidence for Hypothesis H5 that the level 
of e-buying is greater for homogeneous goods than for heterogeneous goods (in terms of 
dollar value). 
 
It is possible that homogeneous goods are ordered for larger dollar value with fewer 
orders compared to heterogeneous goods. However, we would advise caution in 
concluding so, since the results of the Tobit models and the Poisson models do not 




We can summarize the findings of the empirical tests as follows: 
 
H1: The higher the education level of head of household, the greater is e-buying with e-
paying, and the greater is overall e-buying. In the case of e-buying without e-paying 
(equation 1), such a relationship is rejected. Those with higher levels of education may be 
willing to e-pay; they may have better knowledge of latest developments in online 
security or they may know better how to safeguard themselves online. Another aspect to 
note is that a higher income level is normally associated with a higher education level, so 
income may be the real driver of e-buying, rather than education. However, we have 
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controlled for income level in the regressions. Hence we conclude that the evidence, as a 
whole, is consistent with H1 that the higher the education level of head of household, the 
greater the e-buying by household irrespective of income level.  
 
H2: From the empirical tests we conclude that, across the entire population of 
households, the higher the level of household income, the higher the level of e-buying (in 
terms of dollar value). We may note that it is normal for consumption and buying to 
increase as household income increases. Our results may simply reflect this fact rather 
than imply that e-buying as a proportion of overall buying is higher for higher-income 
households.  
 
H3: Both the Poisson regression results and the Tobit regression results do not reject 
Hypothesis H3 that the level of e-buying is less for households with a female as the 
household head. It may be noted that a single-parent household is likely to have a female 
as its head. The single-parent household income level is most likely low, leading to less 
e-buying. Since we have controlled for income in the regressions, we may conclude that 
households with a female as the head of household e-buy less, irrespective of income 
level.  
 
H4: We do not find any unambiguous empirical evidence for the hypothesis that the older 
the head of household, the less the level of e-buying by household. Hence we reject 
Hypothesis H4. 
 
H5: We found that the Tobit results do not reject the hypothesis, in the case of estimated 
total cost of orders in dollars. We also found that the Poisson regression results reject 
Hypothesis H5 and the Tobit results are mixed, in the case of number of separate orders 
ordered online. Thus from the above empirical results, we find evidence for Hypothesis 
H5 that the level of e-buying is greater for homogeneous goods than for heterogeneous 
goods (in terms of dollar value). 
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It is possible that homogeneous goods are ordered for larger dollar value with fewer 
orders compared to heterogeneous goods, since goods under the category 
“heterogeneous” include frequent-purchase items such as food and clothing. However, 
we would advise caution in concluding so, since the results of the Tobit models and the 
Poisson models do not agree. Moreover, our classification of different goods into 
homogeneous goods and heterogeneous goods may be imprecise.  
 
Our theoretical model suggests that homogeneous goods may be more readily bought 
online. The quality parameter of homogeneous goods is almost the same for e-buying as 
for non-ebuying (se ˜  sn) whereas that of heterogeneous goods is lower for e-buying (se < 
sn). Though we find evidence that homogeneous goods are ordered more than the 
heterogeneous goods (in terms of dollar value), we need to compare online buying of 
homogeneous goods (relative to heterogeneous goods) to conventional or overall buying 
of the same (relative to heterogeneous goods), in order to test this implication of the 
theoretical model.  
 
5.4 Issues  
 
5.4.1 Issues in the Theoretical Model 
 
The key aspect of our theoretical model is the use of the variable ?, the taste parameter of 
an individual consumer. Empirical data for many individual-specific factors such as the 
demographic factors age, gender, education, and income are available from the Labour 
Force Survey (LFS), the Household Internet Use Survey (HIUS), and other such statistics 
collected by Statistics Canada and other sources. We build our thesis on the premise that 
the taste parameter ? of our model is probably determined by a combination of such 
factors. Our theoretical model does not suggest what factors determine the taste 
parameter; it does not spell out any specific relationship of the taste parameter ? to the 
individual-specific factors; and it does not express the parameter in terms of these factors. 
In view of this shortcoming, empirically testing the model using available statistics is 
difficult. We overcome this shortcoming by making use of the literature in conjunction 
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with the theoretical model to develop hypotheses for empirical tests. More precise or 
more pertinent hypotheses would be possible if we express the taste parameter ? in terms 
of its determinants.  
 
Another issue with the theoretical model is that we do not suggest specific distributions 
for F(?), which is the distribution of the taste parameter ?. Research into the determinants 
of the taste parameter might help determine possible distributions. Instead of directly 
considering the distribution of the taste parameter, we look at the nature of the available 
variables for the demand function D(p) of the theoretical model. The variables “number 
of separate orders” and “estimated total cost” of e-buying, for which data are readily 
available in the HIUS 2003 dataset, are always positive or zero. Hence we chose a Tobit 
regression for empirical tests. Since “number of separate orders” is essentially a count-
type variable, taking discrete values 0,1,2,…, normality assumption for the error terms of 
the regression models may be inappropriate, so we also chose Poisson regression models 
for tests involving this variable. 
 
5.4.2 Issues in the Empirical Tests 
 
The empirical tests often returned inconclusive results in the case of e-buying without e-
paying, while we often had intuitive results for e-buying with e-paying as well as for all 
e-buying (with and without e-paying). One particular point to note is that for about 1% of 
the total sample size of 23113 for 2003, the data as to whether a homogeneous good was 
ordered or a heterogeneous good was ordered by an e-buying household are suppressed in 
the public use micro-data file of the HIUS 2003. Although only 6 observations had this 
data suppressed in the case of e-buying with e-paying, 228 observations had this data 
suppressed in the case of e-buying without e-paying. We had to exclude these 
observations from our empirical tests. Similar instances occurred for other years (though 
less severely). Though only a few hundred samples were involved, in the empirical tests 
of only e-buying without e-paying, the reduction in the number of influential samples 
would have been much more, proportionally. This reduction probably led to biased 
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estimates for the coefficients. If we had had a complete set of observations for empirical 
tests of e-buying without e-paying, we might have obtained intuitive results.  
 
Another point to note from the empirical results is that we often obtained inconclusive 
results for tests that had “number of separate orders” as the dependent variable, but we 
often obtained clear and intuitive results for tests that had “estimated total cost” as the 
dependent variable. We suggest that the respondents to the HIUS surveys might be less 
precise with respect to their responses about the number of online orders they placed 
relative to how much they paid. The amount of money spent e-buying was easier to retain 
than the number of times they ordered online.36  
 
Another issue with the HIUS 2003 public micro-data set is that the question pertaining to 
a high-speed connection is suppressed. Data from other questions concerning telephone 
line connection and other types of connections do not lend themselves to deriving data 
about the speed of connection, since such connections can be either high-speed or 56 
Kbps (56 kilobits per second is the standard for dial-up modems). Connection speed can 
be associated with search cost (among other things, such as a high-intensity Internet 
user), but we are not able to test whether households with a high-speed connection e-buy 




                                                 
36 It may be noted that a survey respondent quickly responds from memory during a conversation with a 







Our approach and results need to be discussed in the context of our research objective, 
which was to explore factors that influence e-buying adoption by the Canadian public.  
To address the objective, we first built a simple theoretical model in Chapter 2 by 
adapting from Tirole (1989). The model assumed a single good, one unit of which is 
bought by every consumer (household) in a population. Consumers can either e-buy or 
buy conventionally from a local store. A good’s quality is captured by a quality 
parameter, and consumer taste is captured by a taste parameter. These parameters are 
themselves determined by many other factors. The taste parameter is influenced by 
individual-specific factors. The taste parameter is distributed in a certain way in a 
population. Since search, transportation costs, and market reach are different for e-buying 
and conventional buying, final prices are expected to be different. Individuals maximize 
their utilities, so a consumer buys a good if he or she derives utility from the purchase; he 
e-buys if he derives greater utility from e-buying than from conventional buying. There 
are N consumers in the population; the demand for the good is derived in terms of N, 
price and cost, the quality parameter, and the distribution function of the taste parameter. 
We then differentiated possible goods as homogeneous or heterogeneous. The model 
implies that the distribution of the demand of the good is essentially that of the taste 
parameter in the population of consumers (or households), which in turn is influenced by 
price, search cost, and the quality parameter.  
 
We then discussed the associations among price, search cost, and the quality parameter 
and individual-specific demographic factors such as age, gender, education, and income, 
which are central to our research question. Our premise is that the taste parameter of a 
consumer is influenced by such individual-specific factors. That is, the demand for the 
good is affected ultimately by individual-specific factors that shape individuals’ tastes. 
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We did not, however, derive the taste parameter (and hence the demand function) directly 
in terms of demographic factors.   
 
We then extracted the results of the literature that pertain to demographics and other 
determinants of technology use by households or individual consumers. The literature 
helped us to identify potential factors influencing the taste parameter of individuals. 
Reference to the literature was necessary in the absence of direct derivation of our 
theoretical model from the demographic variables.  
 
Although the literature provides evidence that education and income influence household 
adoption of computers and the Internet, past research also weakly suggests that gender 
and age may also affect technology adoption by individuals. Based on these observations 
and from the implications of our theoretical model, we developed hypotheses, associating 
households’ e-buying activities and demographic variables, for empirical tests. Especially 
based on our theoretical model, we developed a hypothesis associating the level of e-
buying activity with the type of good. We did not test any hypothesis concerning the type 
of  connection a household has and its e-buying intensity (though it formed a part of our 
research question), since we do not have data pertaining to connection type in the HIUS 
2003 public use micro-data set.  
 
We tested our hypotheses empirically using the Household Internet Use Survey data 
collected by Statistics Canada pertaining to the years 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2003. The 
dependent variables of our empirical models, namely “number of separate orders (ordered 
online)” and “estimated total cost (of online purchases),” are limited dependent variables. 
Since they are positive or zero, we used Tobit regression suitable for censored models. 
Since they are also count-type data, taking discrete values 0, 1, 2, …, the normality 
assumption of error terms may be inappropriate. Hence we assumed a Poisson probability 
distribution for the dependent variables and carried out the empirical tests using 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation with Poisson type errors. For Poisson type regression, 
we adopted the EPOISSON regression, in which the Poisson parameter ? is itself 
exponentially influenced by the explanatory variables, instead of the POISSON 
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regression, in which ? is linearly influenced. We did so because we had many negative 
XBs in the estimations; in such cases, the POISSON regression is inappropriate since its 
log-likelihood function is not defined for negative XBs. In other words, we assumed at 
the empirical-test stage that the taste parameter ? is distributed in a population as per 
Poisson probability. We did not make any specific assumption about the distribution of ? 
while we developed our theoretical model. We found empirical evidence consistent with 
three (H1, H2, and H3) of our five hypotheses.  
 
6.2 Results Revisited 
 
The empirical test results are consistent with our hypotheses that (1) the higher the 
education level of head of household, the higher the level of e-buying by household, (2) 
the higher the level of household income, the higher the level of e-buying, (3) the level of 
e-buying is less for households with a female as the head of household, and (4) the level 
e-buying is greater for homogeneous goods than for heterogeneous goods; and the results 
reject the hypothesis that the older the head of household, the less the level of e-buying 
by household.  
  
The above results are irrespective of income level, since we have controlled the 
estimations for income level. The result that “the higher the income, the higher the e-
buying” does not necessarily mean that high-income households e-buy more. This result 
may simply reflect that consumption (and hence overall buying) is more for households 
with higher incomes.  
 
6.3 Limitations of the Study 
 
6.3.1 Limitations of the Theoretical Model 
 
Our theoretical model does not determine what factors determine the taste parameter; it 
does not spell out any specific relationship of the taste parameter ? to the individual-
specific factors; and it does not express the parameter in terms of these factors. More 
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precise or more pertinent hypotheses would be possible if we express the taste parameter 
? in terms of its determinants. 
 
Another limitation of the theoretical model is that it does not suggest specific 
distributions for F(?) -  the distribution of the taste parameter ?. However, the model 
allows for a range of distributions to be considered, which we did in our empirical tests. 
If the true distribution is suggested by the theoretical model, hypotheses development and 
empirical tests would be easier. It would prevent mistakes in method selection for 
empirical tests and hence help us to arrive at right conclusions.  
 
The above two limitations may be linked, since identification of the determinants of the 
taste parameter may help determine the true distribution of the parameter. Knowledge of 
the distribution will help firms in their online marketing. The theoretical model is limited 
also in its treatment of the quality parameter s. Further insights about the quality 
parameter will help firms find ways to improve online sales of goods, especially 
heterogeneous goods.  
 
6.3.2 Limitations of the Empirical Tests 
 
Limitations of the empirical tests mostly pertain to limitations with data. Some data of the 
HIUS public use micro-data sets are suppressed reducing the utility of other data 
available. The estimations are hampered seriously because of this limitation, and the 
coefficient estimates obtained in the tests may be biased to that extent. We list below 
some instances of suppressed data affecting our empirical tests.  
 
For about 1% of the total sample size of 23113 for 2003, the data as to whether a 
homogeneous good was ordered or a heterogeneous good was ordered by an e-buying 
household are suppressed in the public use micro-data file of the HIUS 2003. Similar 
suppression was found with the other years. This limitation, mainly in the case of e-
buying without e-paying, forced us to exclude these observations from our empirical 
tests; this exclusion probably led to biased estimates for the coefficients. 
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Data as to whether a household’s Internet connection is a high-speed connection are 
suppressed in the HIUS public use micro-data. This suppression limits us from testing if 
households with high-speed connections e-buy more than those without. Some key pieces 
of data are not directly collected in surveys; some are not derived and reported in the 
public use micro-data set. Users of data have to derive such data, leading perhaps to 
mistakes and hence biased estimates. For example, in our case, we had to infer which 
observations (sample households) had any type of Internet connection from the data as to 
whether a household used the Internet at home in a typical month. Our inference could be 
an under-estimate.  
 
6.4 Conclusions and Implications for Future Research 
 
The research has presented a simple model of a demand function for e-buying in terms of 
a taste parameter distributed in some way in a population of consumers. It also expresses 
the taste parameter in terms of price and cost advantages of e-buying, and the quality 
parameter differential of the good between e-buying and conventional buying. It 
facilitates analysis of e-buying demand with respect to the type of good (homogeneous or 
heterogeneous). It allows for a range of distributions to be assumed for the taste 
parameter. However it does not pinpoint the individual-specific determinants of the taste 
parameter; this fact limits our ability to conduct empirical tests.  
 
The empirical tests of the hypotheses, developed with the aid of the literature in 
conjunction with the theoretical model, show that the level of e-buying is greater for 
households with higher levels of income and education, and less for households with 
females as their heads. The methods used for empirical tests suggest that the taste 
parameter ? may be distributed in a population as per Poisson probability distribution.  
 
Further research may investigate the determinants of the taste parameter and the quality 
parameter. Identification of the determinants of the taste parameter may help pinpoint its 
true distribution. Such knowledge would help firms plan their online sales and marketing 
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of goods, promote the use of the Internet, and promote e-buying by households; greater 
use of the Internet and greater levels of e-buying will increase overall welfare.  
 
This research focussed on the determinants of e-buying by households; future research 
may investigate diffusion path of the use of the Internet and e-buying by Canadian 
households; estimate the parameters of origin, slope, and ceiling of the sigmoid curve; 
and identify the determinants of these parameters. Such knowledge may help public 
authorities and other interested parties plan for the accelerated diffusion of similar 
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Y99 Year control - 1 if 1999; 0, otherwise 
Y00 Year control - 1 if 2000; 0, otherwise 
Y01 Year control - 1 if 2001; 0, otherwise 
Y0337 Year control - 1 if 2003; 0, otherwise 
WTHP Weight for each observation (for replication) 
Nosobuy Number of separate orders ordered online in the pervious 12 months without online payment 
Nosopay Number of separate orders ordered online in the pervious 12 months with online payment 
Nosoall Number of separate orders ordered online in the pervious 12 months with or without online payment 
Etcbuy Expected total cost of online purchases in the previous 12 months without online payment (C$) 
Etcpay Expected total cost of online purchases in the previous 12 months with online payment (C$) 
Etcall Expected total cost of online purchases in the previous 12 months with or without online payment (C$) 
Homobuy 1 if a homogeneous good was ordered online in the pervious 12 months without online payment; 0, otherwise 
Homopay 1 if a homogeneous good was ordered online in the pervious 12 months with online payment; 0, otherwise 
Homogood 1 if a homogeneous good was ordered online in the pervious 12 months with or without online payment; 0, otherwise 
Heterobuy 1 if a heterogeneous good was ordered online in the pervious 12 months without online payment; 0, otherwise 
Heteropay 1 if a heterogeneous good was ordered online in the pervious 12 months with online payment; 0, otherwise 
Heterogood 1 if a heterogeneous good was ordered online in the pervious 12 months with or without online payment; 0, otherwise 
Age1 1 if the age of head of household is < 35; 0, otherwise 
Age2 1 if the age of head of household is between 35 and 54; 0, otherwise 
Age3 1 if the age of head of household is between 55 and 64; 0, otherwise 
Age4 1 if the age of head of household is 65 plus; 0, otherwise 
Male  1 if head of household is a male; 0, otherwise 
Female 1 if head of household is a female; 0, otherwise 
Edu1 1 if the education level of head of household is less than high-school; 0, otherwise 
Edu2 1 if the education level of head of household is high-school or some college; 0, otherwise 
Edu3 1 if the education level of head of household is university degree; 0, otherwise 
                                                 
37 The data of 2002 were not used in the regressions due to issues (the variable “quartile” had values 0 to 9, in stead of 1 to 4) 
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Quart1 1 if the income level of household is in the first (lowest) quartile; 0, otherwise 
Quart2 1 if the income level of household is in the second quartile; 0, if otherwise 
Quart3 1 if the income level of household is in the third quartile; 0, if otherwise 
Quart4 1 if the income level of household is in the fourth quartile; 0, if otherwise 
I_tel 1 if the internet connection of household is through telephone cable; 0, otherwise 
I_otherconnect 1 if the internet connection of household is some other type; 0, otherwise 
I_noconnect 1 if household has no internet connection; 0, otherwise 
 
 
Table A 2.1: Descriptive Statistics, Equations 1 & 2, Full Sample38 Regressions 
  
NAME        N    MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM 
 Y99      126938  0.28547     0.45164     0.20398       0.0000       1.0000 
 Y00      126938  0.26589     0.44181     0.19520       0.0000       1.0000 
 Y01      126938  0.26835     0.44310     0.19634       0.0000       1.0000 
 Y03      126938  0.18028     0.38443     0.14778       0.0000       1.0000 
 WTHP     126938   374.86      334.24     0.11172E+06   41.124       4186.9 
 NOSOBUY  126938  0.20905      2.1062      4.4362       0.0000       150.00 
 ETCBUY   126938   26.659      407.32     0.16591E+06   0.0000       50000. 
 HOMOBUY  126938  0.25272E-01 0.15695     0.24634E-01   0.0000       1.0000 
 HETEROBU 126938  0.26304E-01 0.16004     0.25612E-01   0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE1     126938  0.18390     0.38740     0.15008       0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE2     126938  0.44246     0.49668     0.24669       0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE3     126938  0.15113     0.35818     0.12829       0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE4     126938  0.22251     0.41593     0.17300       0.0000       1.0000 
 MALE     126938  0.75707     0.42885     0.18392       0.0000       1.0000 
 FEMALE   126938  0.24293     0.42885     0.18392       0.0000       1.0000 
 EDU1     126938  0.28780     0.45274     0.20497       0.0000       1.0000 
 EDU2     126938  0.56191     0.49615     0.24617       0.0000       1.0000 
 EDU3     126938  0.15029     0.35735     0.12770       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART1   126938  0.26704     0.44242     0.19573       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART2   126938  0.26150     0.43945     0.19312       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART3   126938  0.24685     0.43118     0.18592       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART4   126938  0.22461     0.41732     0.17416       0.0000       1.0000 
 I_TEL    126938  0.29169     0.45454     0.20661       0.0000       1.0000 
 I_OTHERC 126938  0.92352E-01 0.28952     0.83824E-01   0.0000       1.0000 
 I_NOCONN 126938  0.61460     0.48669     0.23687       0.0000       1.0000 
                                                 
38 Full samples, however, exclude observations for which the type of good ordered (homogeneous or heterogeneous) is unknown. Such exclusions amounted to 




Table A 2.2: Descriptive Statistics, Equations 3 & 4, Full Sample Regressions 
 
NAME        N    MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM 
 WTHP     127184   375.11      334.47     0.11187E+06   41.124       4186.9 
 NOSOPAY  127184  0.61393      4.3797      19.182       0.0000       500.00 
 ETCPAY   127184   79.353      664.03     0.44093E+06   0.0000      0.10000E+06 
 HOMOPAY  127184  0.71715E-01 0.25802     0.66572E-01   0.0000       1.0000 
 HETEROPA 127184  0.62162E-01 0.24145     0.58298E-01   0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE1     127184  0.18398     0.38747     0.15013       0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE2     127184  0.44281     0.49672     0.24673       0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE3     127184  0.15108     0.35813     0.12826       0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE4     127184  0.22213     0.41568     0.17279       0.0000       1.0000 
 MALE     127184  0.75723     0.42876     0.18383       0.0000       1.0000 
 FEMALE   127184  0.24277     0.42876     0.18383       0.0000       1.0000 
 EDU1     127184  0.28743     0.45256     0.20481       0.0000       1.0000 
 EDU2     127184  0.56200     0.49614     0.24616       0.0000       1.0000 
 EDU3     127184  0.15057     0.35763     0.12790       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART1   127184  0.26669     0.44223     0.19557       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART2   127184  0.26122     0.43930     0.19299       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART3   127184  0.24702     0.43128     0.18600       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART4   127184  0.22507     0.41763     0.17441       0.0000       1.0000 
 I_TEL    127184  0.29232     0.45483     0.20687       0.0000       1.0000 
 I_OTHERC 127184  0.92842E-01 0.29021     0.84223E-01   0.0000       1.0000 
 I_NOCONN 127184  0.61348     0.48695     0.23712       0.0000       1.0000 
 
 
Table A 2.3: Descriptive Statistics, Equations 5 & 6, Full Sample Regressions 
 
NAME        N    MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM 
 WTHP     126979   375.01      334.34     0.11179E+06   41.124       4186.9 
 NOSOBUY  126979  0.21425      2.1256      4.5181       0.0000       150.00 
 NOSOPAY  126979  0.61627      4.3849      19.227       0.0000       500.00 
 NOSOALL  126979  0.83052      5.1378      26.397       0.0000       550.00 
 ETCBUY   126979   27.465      410.11     0.16819E+06   0.0000       50000. 
 ETCPAY   126979   79.586      664.62     0.44172E+06   0.0000      0.10000E+06 
 ETCALL   126979   107.05      805.41     0.64868E+06   0.0000      0.10000E+06 
 HOMOGOOD 126979  0.88668E-01 0.28427     0.80807E-01   0.0000       1.0000 
 HETEROGO 126979  0.80950E-01 0.27285     0.74445E-01   0.0000       2.0000 
 AGE1     126979  0.18394     0.38743     0.15010       0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE2     126979  0.44254     0.49669     0.24670       0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE3     126979  0.15110     0.35814     0.12827       0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE4     126979  0.22243     0.41588     0.17296       0.0000       1.0000 
 MALE     126979  0.75709     0.42884     0.18390       0.0000       1.0000 
 FEMALE   126979  0.24291     0.42884     0.18390       0.0000       1.0000 
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 EDU1     126979  0.28772     0.45270     0.20494       0.0000       1.0000 
 EDU2     126979  0.56195     0.49615     0.24616       0.0000       1.0000 
 EDU3     126979  0.15033     0.35740     0.12773       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART1   126979  0.26696     0.44237     0.19569       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART2   126979  0.26135     0.43937     0.19305       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART3   126979  0.24690     0.43121     0.18594       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART4   126979  0.22479     0.41745     0.17426       0.0000       1.0000 
 I_TEL    126979  0.29176     0.45457     0.20664       0.0000       1.0000 
 I_OTHERC 126979  0.92456E-01 0.28967     0.83909E-01   0.0000       1.0000 
 I_NOCONN 126979  0.61442     0.48673     0.23691       0.0000       1.0000 
 
 
Table A 3: Results, Full Sample Tobit Regression 
  









Y00 Y01 Y03 constant 
1 19.72  
***      
20.56 
***       
-
0.145 
***      
0.062 
***    
-
1.288  
***     
-
0.702  
***     
0.637 
***       
0.808 
***     
0.389  
***      
1.095  
***      
0.588 
***       
-
0.619  
***     
-
4.572 
***    
2.808 
***       
3.107 
***      
3.199 






***       
4059  
***      
-
25.43 
***      
1.77   
insig     
-
90.26 
***      
-
59.31 
***      
177.3 
***       
294.1 
***       
30.96 
***       
117.1 
***       
338.6 
***       
-
34.23 
***      
-1010 
***     
406.2 
***       
632.9 
***       
534.2 




3 23.9  
***      
21.82 
***      
-
0.725 
***      
-
0.424 
***      
-
1.608 
***      
-
0.751 
***      
1.326 
***       
1.76 
***       
0.686 
***       
1.126 
***       
1.03 
***       
0.264 
***       
-
5.517 
***      
-
0.372 
***      
0.921 
***       
1.169 





***         
2931  
***        
-
90.54 
***      
-
53.71 
***         
-
160.2 
***        
-
92.27 
***        
141.9 
***          
263.3 
***         
97.23 
***         
178.5 
***         
331.7 
***         
51.1 
***        
-
750.8 
***         
-
72.11 
***         
112.8 
***          
243 
***        
-3922 
***    
5 22.31 
***         
21.14 
***         
-
0.754 
***        
-
0.426 
***        
-
2.527 
***        
-
0.894 
***        
1.858 
***         
2.407 
***         
0.918 
***         
1.773 
***         
1.745 
***         
-
0.039 
***    
-8.99 
***     
2.762 
***         
4.138 
***         
4.429 
***         
-
29.39 
***   
 
6 3305 
***      
2939 
***      
-
86.91 
***      
-
65.87 
***      
-
251.3 
***      
-
90.29 
***      
231.3 
***       
391.9 
***       
113.7 
***       
236.3 
***       
478.2 
***       
28.58 
***       
-1308 
***      
363.9 
***       
630.4 
***       
708.4 










Table A 4: Results, Full Sample Poisson Regression 
  









Y00 Y01 Y03 constant 
1 1.866     
***    
3.033     
***    
-
0.150     
***    
-
0.123     
***    
-
0.492     
***    
-
0.331     
***    
0.091 
***    
0.141     
***    
0.16     
***    
0.268     
***    
0.102     
***    
-
0.131     
***    
-
1.840     
***    
0.676     
***    
0.715     
***    
0.726     
***    
-
2.778     
***    
3 2.011     
***    
2.103     
***    
-
0.103     
***    
-
0.087 
***    
-0.24     
***    
-
0.175     
***    
0.205     
***    
0.243     
***    
0.169     
***    
0.176     
***   
0.237     
***    
0.114     
***    
-0.98     
***    
0.046 
***    
0.170     
***    
0.270     
***    
-
1.908     
***    
5 1.596     
***    
1.954     
***    
-
0.103     
***    
-
0.074 
***    
-
0.335     
***    
-
0.225     
***    
0.238     
***    
0.302     
***    
0.245     
***    
0.287     
***    
0.295     
***    
0.059 
***    
-
1.807     
***    
0.487     
***    
0.580     
***    
0.666     
***    
-
1.844     
***    


















Table A 5.1: Descriptive Statistics, Equations 1 & 2, Sub-Sample39 Regressions 
 
 
NAME        N    MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM 
 WTHP      48922   418.05      363.30     0.13199E+06   41.124       4186.9 
 NOSOBUY   48922  0.51527      3.3129      10.975       0.0000       150.00 
 ETCBUY    48922   66.165      649.17     0.42142E+06   0.0000       50000. 
 HOMOBUY   48922  0.62283E-01 0.24167     0.58405E-01   0.0000       1.0000 
 HETEROBU  48922  0.64163E-01 0.24505     0.60048E-01   0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE1      48922  0.20911     0.40668     0.16539       0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE2      48922  0.58095     0.49341     0.24345       0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE3      48922  0.13759     0.34447     0.11866       0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE4      48922  0.72360E-01 0.25909     0.67125E-01   0.0000       1.0000 
 MALE      48922  0.85358     0.35353     0.12498       0.0000       1.0000 
 FEMALE    48922  0.14642     0.35353     0.12498       0.0000       1.0000 
 EDU1      48922  0.11968     0.32459     0.10536       0.0000       1.0000 
 EDU2      48922  0.62377     0.48444     0.23469       0.0000       1.0000 
 EDU3      48922  0.25655     0.43673     0.19074       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART1    48922  0.11042     0.31342     0.98230E-01   0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART2    48922  0.20502     0.40372     0.16299       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART3    48922  0.30095     0.45868     0.21038       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART4    48922  0.38361     0.48627     0.23646       0.0000       1.0000 
 I_TEL     48922  0.75684     0.42900     0.18404       0.0000       1.0000 
 I_OTHERC  48922  0.23963     0.42686     0.18221       0.0000       1.0000 
 
 
Table A 5.2: Descriptive Statistics, Equations 3 & 4, Sub-Sample Regressions 
 
NAME        N    MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM 
 WTHP      48986   412.28      363.75     0.13231E+06   41.124       4186.9 
 NOSOPAY   48986   1.4382      6.6700      44.489       0.0000       500.00 
 ETCPAY    48986   186.96      1015.3     0.10309E+07   0.0000      0.10000E+06 
 HOMOPAY   48986  0.16013     0.36673     0.13449       0.0000       1.0000 
 HETEROPA  48986  0.14086     0.34788     0.12102       0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE1      48986  0.20900     0.40660     0.16532       0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE2      48986  0.58141     0.49333     0.24338       0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE3      48986  0.13753     0.34441     0.11862       0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE4      48986  0.72061E-01 0.25859     0.66870E-01   0.0000       1.0000 
 MALE      48986  0.85343     0.35368     0.12509       0.0000       1.0000 
                                                 
39 Sub-samples exclude both the observations for which the type of good ordered is unknown and the observations for which there is no Internet connection in 
the household. The sample size N is different for different equations.  
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 FEMALE    48986  0.14657     0.35368     0.12509       0.0000       1.0000 
 EDU1      48986  0.11948     0.32436     0.10521       0.0000       1.0000 
 EDU2      48986  0.62381     0.48443     0.23468       0.0000       1.0000 
 EDU3      48986  0.25671     0.43682     0.19081       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART1    48986  0.11013     0.31306     0.98006E-01   0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART2    48986  0.20492     0.40364     0.16293       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART3    48986  0.30096     0.45868     0.21039       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART4    48986  0.38399     0.48636     0.23655       0.0000       1.0000 
 I_TEL     48986  0.75895     0.42772     0.18295       0.0000       1.0000 
 I_OTHERC  48986  0.24105     0.42772     0.18295       0.0000       1.0000 
 
 
Table A 5.3: Descriptive Statistics, Equations 5 & 6, Sub-Sample Regressions 
 
NAME        N    MEAN        ST. DEV      VARIANCE     MINIMUM      MAXIMUM 
 WTHP      48960   418.38      363.48     0.13212E+06   41.124       4186.9 
 NOSOBUY   48960  0.52665      3.3331      11.109       0.0000       150.00 
 NOSOPAY   48960   1.5443      6.7875      46.070       0.0000       500.00 
 NOSOALL   48960   2.0709      7.9360      62.979       0.0000       550.00 
 ETCBUY    48960   68.101      653.16     0.42662E+06   0.0000       50000. 
 ETCPAY    48960   198.70      1040.5     0.10826E+07   0.0000      0.10000E+06 
 ETCALL    48960   266.80      1261.3     0.15910E+07   0.0000      0.10000E+06 
 HOMOGOOD  48960  0.22010     0.41432     0.17166       0.0000       1.0000 
 HETEROGO  48960  0.19898     0.39939     0.15951       0.0000       2.0000 
 AGE1      48960  0.20917     0.40672     0.16542       0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE2      48960  0.58103     0.49340     0.24344       0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE3      48960  0.13752     0.34440     0.11861       0.0000       1.0000 
 AGE4      48960  0.72283E-01 0.25896     0.67060E-01   0.0000       1.0000 
 MALE      48960  0.85359     0.35352     0.12497       0.0000       1.0000 
 FEMALE    48960  0.14641     0.35352     0.12497       0.0000       1.0000 
 EDU1      48960  0.11961     0.32451     0.10530       0.0000       1.0000 
 EDU2      48960  0.62382     0.48443     0.23467       0.0000       1.0000 
 EDU3      48960  0.25658     0.43675     0.19075       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART1    48960  0.11033     0.31331     0.98163E-01   0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART2    48960  0.20468     0.40347     0.16279       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART3    48960  0.30100     0.45870     0.21040       0.0000       1.0000 
 QUART4    48960  0.38399     0.48636     0.23655       0.0000       1.0000 
 I_TEL     48960  0.75668     0.42909     0.18412       0.0000       1.0000 











Table A 6: Results, Sub-Sample Tobit Regression 
 
Dependent variable: Eq. 1: nosobuy; Eq. 2: etcbuy; Eq. 3: nosopay; Eq. 4: etcpay; Eq. 5: nosoall; and Eq. 6: etcall  
 
Eq. Homo Hetero Age2 Age3 Age4 Female Edu2 Edu3 Quart2 Quart3 Quart4 I_otherc
onnect 
Y00 Y01 Y03 constant 
1 19.41 
***         
20.25 
***       
-
0.039 
***   
0.144 
***       
-
0.497 
***      
-
0.733 
***      
0.153 
***       
0.168 




***       
0.321 
***       
-
0.484 
***      
 
2.756 
***       
2.606 
***     
2.589 





***       
4027 
***       
4.259       
insig   
42.86       
***       
126.2       
***      
-
69.85      
***      
74.12       
***       
164.9       
***       
-19.6      
*** 
33.19       
***     
283.2       
***       
-
6.073      
***      
387       
***         
524.9       
***     
394.5       




3 22.73       
***   
20.93       
***       
-
0.623      
***   
-
0.065   
***       
-1.0      
***      
-
1.245      
***      
1.336       
***       
1.823       
***       
0.433       
*** 
1.086       
***       
0.917       
***       
0.247       
***      5.468       
***         
6.26       
***     
6.446       




4 3252       
***   
2791       
***       
-
63.44      
***   
-
20.11      
***       
-
48.67      
***      
-
128.1      
***      
99.72       
***       
222.8       
***       
78.23       
*** 
181.7       
***       
337.7       
***       
48.98       
***      703.8       
***         
813.5       
***     
939.9       




5 21.63       
***   
20.37       
***       
-
0.497      
***   
0.109       
***       
-
0.961      
***      
-
1.243      
***      
1.112       
***       
1.504       
***       
0.424    
*** 
1.221       
***       
1.161       
***       
0.284       
***      
2.62       
***         
3.193       
***     
3.358       




6 3225       
***   
2844       
***       
-
40.70      
***   
24.70       
***       
9.496   
***      
-
122.6      
***      
112.5       
***       
248.6       
***       
60.04       
*** 
164       
***       
409.6       
***       
76.11       
***      341.2       
***         
492.5       
***     
553.2       
***       
-4185 
*** 















Table A 7: Results, Sub-Sample Poisson Regression 
 
Dependent variable: Eq. 1: nosobuy; Eq. 3: nosopay; and Eq. 5: nosoall;   
 
Eq. Homo Hetero Age2 Age3 Age4 Female Edu2 Edu3 Quart2 Quart3 Quart4 I_otherc
onnect 
Y00 Y01 Y03 constant 
1 1.834     
***  
2.906     
***  
-






0.283     
***  















0.631     
***  
0.572     
***  
0.584     
***  
-
2.424     
***  
3 1.74     
***  









0.141     
***  
-
0.279     
***  
0.183     
***  
0.254     
***  
0.124     
***  
0.155     
***  
0.200     
***  
0.124     
***  
1.154     
***  
1.223     
***  
1.322     
***  
-
2.572     
***  
5 1.547     
***  









0.165     
***  
-
0.275     
***  
0.138     
***  
0.200     
***  
0.123     
***  
0.165     
***  




0.444     
***  
0.470     
***  
0.548     
***  
-
1.472     
***  
Significance level: *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
